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 In this case, we must decide if our state statute limiting civil marriage 
to a union between a man and a woman violates the Iowa Constitution, as 
the district court ruled.  On our review, we hold the Iowa marriage statute 
violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitution.  Therefore, we 
affirm the decision of the district court.   
 I.  Background Facts and Proceedings.   
 This lawsuit is a civil rights action by twelve individuals who reside in 
six communities across Iowa.  Like most Iowans, they are responsible, 
caring, and productive individuals.  They maintain important jobs, or are 
retired, and are contributing, benevolent members of their communities.  
They include a nurse, business manager, insurance analyst, bank agent, 
stay-at-home parent, church organist and piano teacher, museum director, 
federal employee, social worker, teacher, and two retired teachers.  Like 
many Iowans, some have children and others hope to have children.  Some 
are foster parents.  Like all Iowans, they prize their liberties and live within 
the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights will be 
maintained and protected—a belief embraced by our state motto.1   
 Despite the commonality shared with other Iowans, the twelve 
plaintiffs are different from most in one way.  They are sexually and 
romantically attracted to members of their own sex.  The twelve plaintiffs 
comprise six same-sex couples who live in committed relationships.  Each 
maintains a hope of getting married one day, an aspiration shared by many 
throughout Iowa.   
                                       
1The state motto of Iowa is:  “Our liberties we prize and our rights we will maintain.”  
It is inscribed on the Great Seal of Iowa and on our state flag.  See Iowa Code §§ 1A.1, 1B.1 
(2009).   
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 Unlike opposite-sex couples in Iowa, same-sex couples are not 
permitted to marry in Iowa.  The Iowa legislature amended the marriage 
statute in 1998 to define marriage as a union between only a man and a 
woman.2  Despite this law, the six same-sex couples in this litigation asked 
the Polk County recorder to issue marriage licenses to them.  The recorder, 
following the law, refused to issue the licenses, and the six couples have 
been unable to be married in this state.  Except for the statutory restriction 
that defines marriage as a union between a man and a woman, the twelve 
plaintiffs met the legal requirements to marry in Iowa.   
 As other Iowans have done in the past when faced with the 
enforcement of a law that prohibits them from engaging in an activity or 
achieving a status enjoyed by other Iowans, the twelve plaintiffs turned to 
the courts to challenge the statute.  They seek to declare the marriage 
statute unconstitutional so they can obtain the array of benefits of marriage 
enjoyed by heterosexual couples, protect themselves and their children, and 
demonstrate to one another and to society their mutual commitment.   
 In turning to the courts, the twelve plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the 
Polk County District Court.  They claimed the statutory same-sex marriage 
ban violates certain liberty and equality rights under the Iowa Constitution.  
The individual rights claimed by plaintiffs to be adversely affected (by the 
action of the legislative branch in enacting the same-sex marriage ban and 
the action of the government officials of the executive branch in enforcing the 
ban) included the fundamental right to marry, as well as rights to privacy 
and familial association.  Additionally, plaintiffs claimed the legislative and 
                                       
2Iowa Code section 595.2(1) provides “[o]nly a marriage between a male and a female 
is valid.”  All statutory references are to the 2009 Code of Iowa.  While some statutes 
referenced here have been amended since this lawsuit originated, none of the amendments 
dictate the outcome of this case. 
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the executive actions unconstitutionally discriminated against them on 
several bases, including sexual orientation.   
 The case was presented to the district court by means of a summary 
judgment motion.  The record was developed through witness affidavits and 
depositions.  This record included an explanation by some of the plaintiffs of 
the disadvantages and fears they face each day due to the inability to obtain 
a civil marriage in Iowa.  These disadvantages and problems include the legal 
inability to make many life and death decisions affecting their partner, 
including decisions related to health care, burial arrangements, autopsy, 
and disposition of remains following death.  Various plaintiffs told of the 
inability to share in their partners’ state-provided health insurance, public-
employee pension benefits, and many private-employer-provided benefits 
and protections.  They also explained how several tax benefits are denied.  
Adoption proceedings are also more cumbersome and expensive for 
unmarried partners.  Other obstacles presented by the inability to enter into 
a civil marriage include numerous nongovernmental benefits of marriage 
that are so common in daily life they often go unnoticed, such as something 
so simple as spousal health club memberships.  Yet, perhaps the ultimate 
disadvantage expressed in the testimony of the plaintiffs is the inability to 
obtain for themselves and for their children the personal and public 
affirmation that accompanies marriage.   
 The parties also explored the reasons for defining marriage in a way 
that denies these benefits to same-sex couples.  The County offered five 
primary interests of society in support of the legislature’s exclusive definition 
of marriage.  The first three interests are broadly related to the advancement 
of child rearing.  Specifically, the objectives centered on promoting 
procreation, promoting child rearing by a mother and a father within a 
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marriage, and promoting stability in an opposite-sex relationship to raise 
and nurture children.  The fourth interest raised by the County addressed 
the conservation of state resources, while the final reason concerned the 
governmental interest in promoting the concept and integrity of the 
traditional notion of marriage.   
 Much of the testimony presented by the County was in the form of 
opinions by various individuals that same-sex marriage would harm the 
institution of marriage and also harm children raised in same-sex marriages.  
Two college professors testified that a heterosexual marriage is, overall, the 
optimal forum in which to raise children.  A retired pediatrician challenged 
the accuracy of some of the medical research that concludes there is no 
significant difference between children raised by same-sex couples and 
opposite-sex couples.  A clinical psychologist testified sexual orientation is 
not as defined and stable as race and gender and can change over time.  He 
acknowledged, however, it is difficult to change a person’s sexual orientation, 
and efforts to do so can be harmful to the person.   
 The plaintiffs produced evidence to demonstrate sexual orientation 
and gender have no effect on children raised by same-sex couples, and 
same-sex couples can raise children as well as opposite-sex couples.  They 
also submitted evidence to show that most scientific research has repudiated 
the commonly assumed notion that children need opposite-sex parents or 
biological parents to grow into well-adjusted adults.  Many leading 
organizations, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American 
Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the National 
Association of Social Workers, and the Child Welfare League of America, 
weighed the available research and supported the conclusion that gay and 
lesbian parents are as effective as heterosexual parents in raising children.  
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For example, the official policy of the American Psychological Association 
declares, “There is no scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is 
related to parental sexual orientation:  Lesbian and gay parents are as likely 
as heterosexual parents to provide supportive and healthy environments for 
children.”3  Almost every professional group that has studied the issue 
indicates children are not harmed when raised by same-sex couples, but to 
the contrary, benefit from them.  In Iowa, agencies that license foster parents 
have found same-sex couples to be good and acceptable parents.  It is 
estimated that more than 5800 same-sex couples live throughout Iowa, and 
over one-third of these couples are raising children.   
 The district court concluded the statute was unconstitutional under 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Iowa Constitution and 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.  It initially ordered the county 
recorder to begin processing marriage licenses for same-sex couples, but 
stayed the order during the pendency of an appeal.   
 II.  Standard of Review.   
 Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).  “An issue of fact is 
‘material’ only when the dispute is over facts that might affect the outcome of 
the suit, given the applicable governing law.”  Junkins v. Branstad, 421 
N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1988).  The party requesting summary judgment 
                                       
3This statement is the official policy of the American Psychological Association 
regarding sexual orientation, parents, and children.  See Am. Psychological Ass’n Council of 
Representatives, Am. Psychological Ass’n, Resolution on Sexual Orientation, Parents, and 
Children (2004), in Ruth Ullmann Paige, Proceedings of the American Psychological 
Association for the Legislative Year 2004:  Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of 
Representatives July 28 & 30, 2004, Honolulu, HI, 60 Am. Psychologist 436–511 (July–
August 2005), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/parents.html (reporting 
adoption of resolution). 
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shoulders the burden to demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact 
exists.  Hunter v. City of Des Moines Mun. Hous. Auth., 742 N.W.2d 578, 584 
(Iowa 2007).  We review the legal issues necessary for resolution of the 
constitutional claims presented within the context of the summary judgment 
proceeding de novo.  Kistler v. City of Perry, 719 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Iowa 
2006). 
 III.  Constitutional Separation of Powers.   
 We approach the resolution of this case with a keen and respectful 
understanding of our Iowa Constitution and the vital roles of the three 
branches of government, as well as the role of the people.  It is important for 
these roles to be identified and expressed from time to time when individuals 
seek recognition of rights, if only to serve as a reminder of the process of 
governing that has served us so well as a state for over 150 years.   
 The Iowa Constitution is the cornerstone of governing in Iowa.  Like 
the United States Constitution, the Iowa Constitution creates a remarkable 
blueprint for government.  It establishes three separate, but equal, branches 
of government and delineates the limited roles and powers of each branch.  
See Iowa Const. art. III, § 1 (“The powers of the government of Iowa shall be 
divided into three separate departments—the legislative, the executive, and 
the judicial:  and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function 
appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly 
directed or permitted.”).  Among other basic principles essential to our form 
of government, the constitution defines certain individual rights upon which 
the government may not infringe.  See Iowa Const. art. I (“Bill of Rights”).  
Equal protection of the law is one of the guaranteed rights.  See Iowa Const. 
art. I, § 6.  All these rights and principles are declared and undeniably 
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accepted as the supreme law of this state, against which no contrary law can 
stand.  See Iowa Const. art. XII, § 1 (“This constitution shall be the supreme 
law of the state, and any law inconsistent therewith, shall be void.”).   
 This case, as with most other civil rights actions before it, implicates 
these broad constitutional principles of governing.  The legislature, in 
carrying out its constitutional role to make public policy decisions, enacted a 
law that effectively excludes gay and lesbian people from the institution of 
civil marriage.  The executive branch of government, in carrying out its role 
to execute the law, enforced this statute through a county official who 
refused to issue marriage licenses to six same-sex couples.  These Iowans, 
believing that the law is inconsistent with certain constitutional mandates, 
exercised their constitutional right to petition the courts for redress of their 
grievance.  This court, consistent with its role to interpret the law and 
resolve disputes, now has the responsibility to determine if the law enacted 
by the legislative branch and enforced by the executive branch violates the 
Iowa Constitution.   
A statute inconsistent with the Iowa Constitution must be declared 
void, even though it may be supported by strong and deep-seated traditional 
beliefs and popular opinion.  Iowa Const. art. XII, § 1 (providing any law 
inconsistent with the constitution is void).  As Chief Justice John Marshall 
wrote over two centuries ago, “It is a proposition too plain to be contested, 
that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it . . . .”  
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60, 73 (1803).   
It is also well established that courts must, under all circumstances, 
protect the supremacy of the constitution as a means of protecting our 
republican form of government and our freedoms.  As was observed by 
Justice Robert H. Jackson decades ago in reference to the United States 
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Constitution, the very purpose of limiting the power of the elected branches 
of government by constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause 
is “to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, 
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”  W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 1185, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 
1638 (1943).   
The same principle applies to the provisions of the Iowa Constitution 
that limit government power.  The idea that courts, free from the political 
influences in the other two branches of government, are better suited to 
protect individual rights was recognized at the time our Iowa Constitution 
was formed.  See Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543, 667, 15 N.W. 609, 640–41 
(1883) (Beck, J., dissenting) (“Judges ought not to be partisans, and be 
influenced by partisan control.  Their duty is to interpret and apply the law, 
to the end that the liberty, and the rights and property, of the people may be 
secured.”); 1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention; of the State of 
Iowa 453 (W. Blair Lord rep.) (Davenport, Luse, Lane & Co. 1857) (containing 
expression of one delegate’s desire “to have one department of our State 
government in regard to which we can say, there is no political taint or bias, 
there is no partisan complexion to it; it is of such a character that when we 
go before it to have our dearest rights decided, we may rest assured that they 
will be decided upon principles of law and equity, and not upon political or 
party principles”). 
In fulfilling this mandate under the Iowa Constitution, we look to the 
past and to precedent.  We look backwards, not because citizens’ rights are 
constrained to those previously recognized, but because historical 
15 
 
constitutional principles provide the framework to define our future as we 
confront the challenges of today.   
Our responsibility, however, is to protect constitutional rights of 
individuals from legislative enactments that have denied those rights, even 
when the rights have not yet been broadly accepted, were at one time 
unimagined, or challenge a deeply ingrained practice or law viewed to be 
impervious to the passage of time.  The framers of the Iowa Constitution 
knew, as did the drafters of the United States Constitution, that “times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress,” and as our 
constitution “endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles 
in their own search for greater freedom” and equality.  See Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 526 
(2003) (acknowledging intent of framers of Federal Constitution that 
Constitution endure and be interpreted by future generations); Callender v. 
Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (“Our constitution is not merely 
tied to tradition, but recognizes the changing nature of society.”).   
When individuals invoke the Iowa Constitution’s guarantees of 
freedom and equality, courts are bound to interpret those guarantees.  In 
carrying out this fundamental and vital role, “we must never forget that it is 
a constitution we are expounding.”  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 407, 4 L. Ed. 579, 602 (1819).  It speaks with principle, as we, in turn, 
must also.  See State v. Wheeler, 34 P.3d 799, 807 (Wash. 2001) (Sanders, 
J., dissenting).   
Finally, it should be recognized that the constitution belongs to the 
people, not the government or even the judicial branch of government.  See 
Iowa Const. art. I, § 2 (“All political power is inherent in the people. 
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Government is instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of the 
people, and they have the right, at all times, to alter or reform the same, 
whenever the public good may require it.”).  While the constitution is the 
supreme law and cannot be altered by the enactment of an ordinary statute, 
the power of the constitution flows from the people, and the people of Iowa 
retain the ultimate power to shape it over time.  See Iowa Const. art. X 
(“Amendments to the Constitution”).   
 IV.  Equal Protection. 
 A.  Background Principles.  The primary constitutional principle at 
the heart of this case is the doctrine of equal protection.  The concept of 
equal protection is deeply rooted in our national and state history, but that 
history reveals this concept is often expressed far more easily than it is 
practiced.  For sure, our nation has struggled to achieve a broad national 
consensus on equal protection of the laws when it has been forced to apply 
that principle to some of the institutions, traditions, and norms woven into 
the fabric of our society.  This observation is important today because it 
reveals equal protection can only be defined by the standards of each 
generation.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:  A 
Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1163 (1988) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause looks 
forward, serving to invalidate practices that were widespread at the time of 
its ratification and that were expected to endure.”).   
The process of defining equal protection, as shown by our history as 
captured and told in court decisions, begins by classifying people into 
groups.  A classification persists until a new understanding of equal 
protection is achieved.  The point in time when the standard of equal 
protection finally takes a new form is a product of the conviction of one, or 
17 
 
many, individuals that a particular grouping results in inequality and the 
ability of the judicial system to perform its constitutional role free from the 
influences that tend to make society’s understanding of equal protection 
resistant to change.  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes poignantly said, “It is 
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply 
persists from blind imitation of the past.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice, 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The Path of the Law, address 
dedicating new hall at Boston University School of Law (January 8, 1897), in 
10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897).  This concept is evident in our past cases. 
In the first reported case of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Iowa, 
In re Ralph, 1 Morris 1 (Iowa 1839), we refused to treat a human being as 
property to enforce a contract for slavery and held our laws must extend 
equal protection to persons of all races and conditions.  1 Morris at 9.  This 
decision was seventeen years before the United States Supreme Court 
infamously decided Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 
691 (1856), which upheld the rights of a slave owner to treat a person as 
property.  Similarly, in Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868), and 
Coger v. North West. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873), we struck blows 
to the concept of segregation long before the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 
L. Ed. 873 (1954).  Iowa was also the first state in the nation to admit a 
woman to the practice of law, doing so in 1869.  Admission of Women to the 
Bar, 1 Chicago Law Times 76, 76 (1887).  Her admission occurred three 
years before the United States Supreme Court affirmed the State of Illinois’ 
decision to deny women admission to the practice of law, see Bradwell v. 
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Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139, 21 L. Ed. 442, 445 (1873), and twenty-
five years before the United States Supreme Court affirmed the refusal of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia to admit women into the practice of law, see 
Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 118, 14 S. Ct. 1082, 1083, 38 L. Ed. 929, 
930 (1894).  In each of those instances, our state approached a fork in the 
road toward fulfillment of our constitution’s ideals and reaffirmed the 
“absolute equality of all” persons before the law as “the very foundation 
principle of our government.”4  See Coger, 37 Iowa at 153. 
So, today, this court again faces an important issue that hinges on our 
definition of equal protection.  This issue comes to us with the same 
importance as our landmark cases of the past.  The same-sex-marriage 
debate waged in this case is part of a strong national dialogue5 centered on a 
fundamental, deep-seated, traditional institution that has excluded, by state 
action, a particular class of Iowans.  This class of people asks a simple and 
direct question:  How can a state premised on the constitutional principle of 
equal protection justify exclusion of a class of Iowans from civil marriage?   
                                       
4The cases we have cited are not meant to imply this court has been at the forefront 
in recognizing civil rights in all areas and at all times.  See, e.g., In re Carragher, 149 Iowa 
225, 229–30, 128 N.W. 352, 354 (1910) (upholding a law that effectively denied women 
pharmacists the right to sell alcohol, stating “discrimination between the sexes is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious, and the fact that in many instances individuals of one sex are in 
general better fitted than those of the other sex for a given occupation or business is one of 
such common knowledge and observation that the Legislature may properly recognize it in 
enacting regulations therefor”).  These cases do, however, reflect this court has, for the most 
part, been at the forefront in recognizing individuals’ civil rights.  The path we have taken as 
a state has not been by accident, but has been navigated with the compass of equality firmly 
in hand, constructed with a pointer balanced carefully on the pivot of equal protection. 
5One commentator has found that, since the same-sex marriage debate started, 
twenty-seven states have passed constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage, 
and seventeen of those state amendments also ban other official forms of same-sex 
relationships, such as civil unions.  Ben Schuman, Note, Gods & Gays:  Analyzing the Same-
Sex Marriage Debate from a Religious Perspective, 96 Geo. L.J. 2103, 2106–08 (2008).  Only 
one state has recognized same-sex marriage, while several other states recognize civil 
unions or another form of same-sex relationship.  Id. 
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 B.  Legal Tests to Gauge Equal Protection.  The foundational 
principle of equal protection is expressed in article I, section 6 of the Iowa 
Constitution, which provides:  “All laws of a general nature shall have a 
uniform operation; the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen or 
class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall 
not equally belong to all citizens.”  See also Iowa Const. art. I, § 1 (“All men 
and women are, by nature, free and equal . . . .”); id. art. I, § 2 (recognizing 
“[a]ll political power is inherent in the people” and “[g]overnment is instituted 
for the protection, security, and benefit of the people”).  Like the Federal 
Equal Protection Clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, Iowa’s constitutional promise of equal protection “ ‘is 
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike.’ ”6  Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 
2004) [hereinafter RACI II] (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985)).   
Even in the zealous protection of the constitution’s mandate of equal 
protection, courts must give respect to the legislative process and presume 
                                       
6Plaintiffs’ challenge to Iowa Code section 595.2 is based on the equal protection 
guarantee in the Iowa Constitution and does not implicate federal constitutional protections.  
Generally, we view the federal and state equal protection clauses as “identical in scope, 
import, and purpose.”  Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 187.  At the same time, we have jealously 
guarded our right to “employ a different analytical framework” under the state equal 
protection clause as well as to independently apply the federally formulated principles.  
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 4–7 (Iowa 2004).  Here again, we find 
federal precedent instructive in interpreting the Iowa Constitution, but we refuse to follow it 
blindly.   
The United States Supreme Court has not resolved the broad question of whether an 
absolute ban of marriages between persons of the same sex violates the Federal Equal 
Protection Clause.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S. Ct. at 2484, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 525 
(noting that case does not decide “whether the government must give formal recognition to 
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter”).  Nor has the Court resolved many 
of the narrower legal questions presented by this lawsuit.  Nonetheless, the federal 
framework traditionally employed for resolution of equal protection cases provides a useful 
starting point for evaluation of Iowa’s constitutional equal protection provision. 
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its enactments are constitutional.  We understand that Iowa’s tripartite 
system of government requires the legislature to make difficult policy 
choices, including distributing benefits and burdens amongst the citizens of 
Iowa.  In this process, some classifications and barriers are inevitable.  As a 
result, courts pay deference to legislative decisions when called upon to 
determine whether the Iowa Constitution’s mandate of equality has been 
violated by legislative action.  More specifically, when evaluating challenges 
based on the equal protection clause, our deference to legislative policy-
making is primarily manifested in the level of scrutiny we apply to review 
legislative action.   
 In most cases, we apply a very deferential standard known as the 
“rational basis test.”  Id.  Under the rational basis test, “[t]he plaintiff has the 
heavy burden of showing the statute unconstitutional and must negate every 
reasonable basis upon which the classification may be sustained.”  Bierkamp 
v. Rogers, 293 N.W.2d 577, 579–80 (Iowa 1980).  In deference to the 
legislature, a statute will satisfy the requirements of the equal protection 
clause 
“so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the 
classification, the legislative facts on which the classification is 
apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true 
by the governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the 
classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational.” 
RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 
539 U.S. 103, 107, 123 S. Ct. 2156, 2159, 156 L. Ed. 2d 97, 103 (2003)).  
Although the rational basis test is “deferential to legislative judgment, ‘it is 
not a toothless one’ in Iowa.”  Id. at 9 (quoting Mathews v. de Castro, 429 
U.S. 181, 185, 97 S. Ct. 431, 434, 50 L. Ed. 2d 389, 394 (1976)).  The 
rational basis test defers to the legislature’s prerogative to make policy 
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decisions by requiring only a plausible policy justification, mere rationality of 
the facts underlying the decision and, again, a merely rational relationship 
between the classification and the policy justification.  Nonetheless, the 
deference built into the rational basis test is not dispositive because this 
court engages in a meaningful review of all legislation challenged on equal 
protection grounds by applying the rational basis test to the facts of each 
case.  Id. (citing Bierkamp, 293 N.W.2d at 581).7  
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection, however, demands 
certain types of statutory classifications must be subjected to closer scrutiny 
by courts.  See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394, 
72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 799 (1982) (“[W]e would not be faithful to our obligations 
under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to 
every classification.”).  Thus, courts apply a heightened level of scrutiny 
under equal protection analysis when reasons exist to suspect “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities . . . which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
                                       
7Under a traditional rational basis review, courts are required to accept generalized 
reasons to support the legislation, even if the fit between the means and end is far from 
perfect.  See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L. Ed. 2d 
393, 399 (1961) (“[L]egislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional 
powers despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.” (Citations 
omitted.)).  Moreover, the challengers bear the burden of negating every conceivable rational 
basis that might support the classification drawn in the statute.  FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211, 221 (1993).  Some legal 
commentators have suggested that the occasional practice of courts to examine the purpose 
of the law more closely under the rational basis test has actually created an additional 
category of equal protection analysis called “rational basis with bite.”  See Gayle Lynn 
Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite:  Intermediate Scrutiny By Any Other Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 
779, 780 (1987) (“[R]ational basis with bite is simply intermediate scrutiny without an 
articulation of the factors that triggered it . . . .”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of 
Rational Basis with Bite:  Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of 
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 
2769, 2774 (2005); Steven P. Wieland, Gambling, Greyhounds, and Gay Marriage:  How the 
Supreme Court Can Use the Rational-Basis Test to Address Varnum v. Brien, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 
413, 438–42 (2008) (suggesting the Iowa Supreme Court apply “rational basis with bite”).   
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protect minorities.”  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4, 58 S. Ct. 778, 783 n.4, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1242 n.4 (1938).   
Under this approach, classifications based on race, alienage, or 
national origin and those affecting fundamental rights are evaluated 
according to a standard known as “strict scrutiny.”  Sherman v. Pella Corp., 
576 N.W.2d 312, 317 (Iowa 1998).  Classifications subject to strict scrutiny 
are presumptively invalid and must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest.  In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Iowa 
2004).   
A middle tier of analysis exists between rational basis and strict 
scrutiny.  This intermediate tier has been applied to statutes classifying on 
the basis of gender or illegitimacy and requires the party seeking to uphold 
the statute to demonstrate the challenged classification is substantially 
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.  
Sherman, 576 N.W.2d at 317.  It is known as “intermediate scrutiny” or 
“heightened scrutiny,”8 and groups entitled to this tier of review are often 
called “quasi-suspect” groups.  See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 445, 
105 S. Ct. at 3258, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 324.  To survive intermediate scrutiny, 
the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be 
substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the 
classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad 
generalizations.  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S. Ct. 
2264, 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735, 751 (1996). 
 C.  Determination of Constitutional Facts.  The parties expended 
considerable effort developing a summary judgment record to assist the 
                                       
8References to “heightened” scrutiny in this opinion are meant to be general; 
heightened scrutiny includes any judicial inquiry more searching than the rational basis 
test.  References to “intermediate” scrutiny discuss a specific level of scrutiny between the 
rational basis test and strict scrutiny.  
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district court in deciding the legal issues presented in this case, including 
which level of scrutiny to apply.  Before proceeding to determine these legal 
issues, we consider the role of the evidence offered by the parties to support 
their legal arguments.  The district court excluded some of the offered 
testimony, which the County has raised as an issue on appeal.   
 Our law recognizes a distinction between “adjudicative” and 
“legislative” facts.  Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 641 
N.W.2d 823, 836 (Iowa 2002).  Most often, judicial decision-making is 
predicated solely on a finding of facts relating to the parties and their 
particular circumstances.  Id.  These facts are referred to as “adjudicative” 
facts, see id., and the resolution of a dispute over these facts is done within 
the framework of a set of rules to determine the admissibility of evidence 
tending to prove such facts.  See generally Iowa Rs. Evid.  At times, however, 
judicial decision-making involves crafting rules of law based on social, 
economic, political, or scientific facts.  See 2 John W. Strong, McCormick on 
Evidence § 328, at 369 (5th ed. 1999) [hereinafter McCormick on Evidence].  
These facts have been denominated as “legislative” facts and become relevant 
to judicial decision-making when courts are required to decide the 
constitutionality of a statute, among other occasions.  Id.  As a result, 
judicial decision-making in the context of constitutional issues can involve 
the “process of adapting law to a volatile social-political environment.”  Id. at 
370.  Legislative facts are relevant in deciding these constitutional issues 
because courts must normally analyze “whether there exist circumstances 
which constitutionally either legitimate the exercise of legislative power or 
substantiate the rationality of the legislative product.”  Id.  In fact, the 
common role of legislative facts in constitutional cases has led to an 
alternative designation of legislative facts called “constitutional facts” to 
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better describe those facts “which assist a court in forming a judgment on a 
question of constitutional law.”  Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems 
of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 403 (1942).   
 Unlike adjudicative facts, legislative or constitutional facts “may be 
presented either formally or informally.”  Welsh v. Branstad, 470 N.W.2d 
644, 648 (Iowa 1991).  There is no formalized set of rules governing a court’s 
ability to consider legislative or constitutional facts.  See Iowa R. Evid. 5.201 
(applying rule governing judicial notice only to adjudicative facts); Fed. R. 
Evid. 201 advisory committee’s note (“No rule deals with judicial notice of 
‘legislative facts.’ ”).  See generally City of Council Bluffs v. Cain, 342 N.W.2d 
810, 816–17 (Iowa 1983) (McCormick, J., dissenting).  Thus, constitutional 
facts are introduced into judicial decisions through independent research by 
judges and written briefs of the parties, as well as testimony of witnesses.  
See McCormick on Evidence at 381–84.  Importantly, constitutional facts are 
not subject to the rules of evidence when presented by a party in the form of 
witness testimony.  Conceptually, testimony relating to constitutional facts is 
only presented as authority for the legal decision the court is required to 
make, and it would be inconsistent to apply formal rules of evidence to facts 
in the form of testimony that a court can independently obtain and consider 
in deciding the case.   
 Nonetheless, courts consider the “actual truth-content” of 
constitutional facts.  See id. at 382–83.  Such facts are generally disputable, 
and courts must rely on the most compelling data in order to give needed 
intellectual legitimacy to the law or rule crafted by the court.  Id. at 383.   
 Consequently, we review all of the material tendered by the parties in 
this case to assist us in our review of the constitutionality of the civil 
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marriage statute.  The error committed by the trial court in failing to do so is 
of no consequence under our de novo reviewing standard.   
D.  Similarly Situated People.  The County seeks to undercut the 
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim by asserting the plaintiffs are not similarly 
situated to heterosexuals.  We consider this threshold argument before 
proceeding to the application of our equal protection test. 
We begin by recognizing the constitutional pledge of equal protection 
does not prohibit laws that impose classifications.  Chicago & Nw. Ry. v. 
Fachman, 255 Iowa 989, 996, 125 N.W.2d 210, 214 (1963) (recognizing “it is 
often necessary in accomplishing efficient and beneficial legislation to divide 
the subjects upon which it operates into classes”).  Many statutes impose 
classifications by granting special benefits or declaring special burdens, and 
the equal protection clause does not require all laws to apply uniformly to all 
people.  Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10, 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 
L. Ed. 2d 1, 12 (1992).  Instead, equal protection demands that laws treat 
alike all people who are “ ‘similarly situated with respect to the legitimate 
purposes of the law.’ ”  RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 7 (quoting Coll. Area Renters 
& Landlord Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 520 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996)) (emphasis omitted).   
This requirement of equal protection—that the law must treat all 
similarly situated people the same—has generated a narrow threshold test.  
Under this threshold test, if plaintiffs cannot show as a preliminary matter 
that they are similarly situated, courts do not further consider whether their 
different treatment under a statute is permitted under the equal protection 
clause.  See, e.g., Timberland Partners XXI, LLP v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 757 
N.W.2d 172, 176–77 (Iowa 2008) (applying threshold analysis); In re Det. of 
Hennings, 744 N.W.2d 333, 338–40 (Iowa 2008) (same); Grovijohn v. Virjon, 
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Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2002) (same).  Not only have we utilized this 
test in the past, but courts from other jurisdictions have confronted it in 
cases involving equal protection challenges to statutes that restrict marriage 
to opposite-sex couples.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 435 n.54 
(Cal. 2008) (analyzing and rejecting the government’s threshold argument 
that same-sex couples are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples); 
Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423–24 & n.19 (Conn. 
2008) (same).   
The County references this threshold test in this case and asserts the 
plaintiffs are not similarly situated to opposite-sex couples so as to 
necessitate further equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs cannot 
“procreate naturally.”  In other words, the County argues the statute does 
not treat similarly situated persons differently, but merely treats dissimilar 
persons differently.   
In considering whether two classes are similarly situated, a court 
cannot simply look at the trait used by the legislature to define a 
classification under a statute and conclude a person without that trait is not 
similarly situated to persons with the trait.  See Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. 
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002) (RACI I); Joseph Tussman & 
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. Rev. 341, 
344–47 (1949) [hereinafter Tussman & tenBroek].  The equal protection 
clause does not merely ensure the challenged statute applies equally to all 
people in the legislative classification.  “ ‘[S]imilarly situated’ cannot mean 
simply ‘similar in the possession of the classifying trait.’  All members of any 
class are similarly situated in this respect and consequently, any 
classification whatsoever would be reasonable by this test.”  Tussman & 
tenBroek, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 345.  In the same way, the similarly situated 
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requirement cannot possibly be interpreted to require plaintiffs to be 
identical in every way to people treated more favorably by the law.  No two 
people or groups of people are the same in every way, and nearly every equal 
protection claim could be run aground onto the shoals of a threshold 
analysis if the two groups needed to be a mirror image of one another.  Such 
a threshold analysis would hollow out the constitution’s promise of equal 
protection. 
Thus, equal protection before the law demands more than the equal 
application of the classifications made by the law.  The law itself must be 
equal.  See Fachman, 255 Iowa at 998, 125 N.W.2d at 215 (“ ‘The equal 
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws . . . .’ ” 
(quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 1070, 30 
L. Ed. 220, 226 (1886))).  In other words, to truly ensure equality before the 
law, the equal protection guarantee requires that laws treat all those who are 
similarly situated with respect to the purposes of the law alike.  RACI II, 675 
N.W.2d at 7.  This requirement makes it “impossible to pass judgment on the 
reasonableness of a [legislative] classification without taking into 
consideration, or identifying, the purpose of the law.”  Tussman & tenBroek, 
37 Cal. L. Rev. at 347.  The purposes of the law must be referenced in order 
to meaningfully evaluate whether the law equally protects all people similarly 
situated with respect to those purposes.  For these reasons, the trait 
asserted by the County is insufficient to support its threshold argument. 
Nevertheless, we have said our marriage laws “are rooted in the 
necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental 
relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.”  Laws 
v. Griep, 332 N.W.2d 339, 341 (Iowa 1983); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993) (stating civil marriage is “ ‘a partnership to which 
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both partners bring their financial resources as well as their individual 
energies and efforts’ ” (quoting Gussin v. Gussin, 836 P.2d 484, 491 (Haw. 
1992))).  These laws also serve to recognize the status of the parties’ 
committed relationship.  See Madison v. Colby, 348 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 
1984) (stating “ ‘the marriage state is not one entered into for the purpose of 
labor and support alone,’ ” but also includes “ ‘the comfort and happiness of 
the parties to the marriage contract’ ” (quoting Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 
697–98, 60 N.W. 202, 203 (Iowa 1894)) (emphasis added)); Hamilton v. 
McNeill, 150 Iowa 470, 478, 129 N.W. 480, 482 (1911) (“The marriage to be 
dissolved is not a mere contract, but is a status.”); Turner v. Hitchcock, 20 
Iowa 310, 325 (1866) (Lowe, C.J., concurring) (observing that marriage 
changes the parties’ “legal and social status”). 
Therefore, with respect to the subject and purposes of Iowa’s marriage 
laws, we find that the plaintiffs are similarly situated compared to 
heterosexual persons.  Plaintiffs are in committed and loving relationships, 
many raising families, just like heterosexual couples.  Moreover, official 
recognition of their status provides an institutional basis for defining their 
fundamental relational rights and responsibilities, just as it does for 
heterosexual couples.  Society benefits, for example, from providing same-
sex couples a stable framework within which to raise their children and the 
power to make health care and end-of-life decisions for loved ones, just as it 
does when that framework is provided for opposite-sex couples.   
In short, for purposes of Iowa’s marriage laws, which are designed to 
bring a sense of order to the legal relationships of committed couples and 
their families in myriad ways, plaintiffs are similarly situated in every 
important respect, but for their sexual orientation.  As indicated above, this 
distinction cannot defeat the application of equal protection analysis through 
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the application of the similarly situated concept because, under this circular 
approach, all distinctions would evade equal protection review.  Therefore, 
with respect to the government’s purpose of “providing an institutional basis 
for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of 
persons,” same–sex couples are similarly situated to opposite–sex couples.9 
E.  Classification Undertaken in Iowa Code Section 595.2.  
Plaintiffs believe Iowa Code section 595.2 classifies on the bases of gender 
and sexual orientation.  The County argues the same-sex marriage ban does 
not discriminate on either basis.  The district court held section 595.2 
classifies according to gender.  As we will explain, we believe the ban on civil 
marriages between two people of the same sex classifies on the basis of 
sexual orientation. 
                                       
9While we have applied the threshold analysis in previous cases, we have, at times, 
directly or indirectly infused that analysis with principles traditionally applied in the 
complete equal protection analysis.  See, e.g., Hennings, 744 N.W.2d at 338–39 (disposing of 
an equal protection claim with a threshold similarly situated analysis, but within that 
threshold analysis evaluating the relationship of the state’s interest and the classification 
made by the statute); see also Timberland Partners XXI, LLP, 757 N.W.2d at 176–77 
(implicitly considering relationship between classifications and taxing interests of the state 
by focusing on distinctions in the use of commercial and residential property); Grovijohn, 
643 N.W.2d at 204 (using threshold test to find the notice provisions of the dramshop 
statute treat all dramshop plaintiffs the same, but determining plaintiff failed to articulate 
how the adoption of the comparative fault statute altered prior case law finding the notice 
requirement did not violate equal protection).  This approach is almost inevitable for the test 
to have any real value as an analytical tool to resolve equal protection claims.  
Consequently, we question the usefulness of the threshold test and express caution in the 
future use of the threshold analysis.  See, e.g., Angie Baker, Note, Leapfrogging Over Equal 
Protection Analysis:  The Eighth Circuit Sanctions Separate and Unequal Prison Facilities for 
Males and Females in Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 371, 385 (1999) 
(noting United States Supreme Court has not applied “similarly situated” analysis as a 
threshold test); Donna Laddy, Can Women Prisoners Be Carpenters?  A Proposed Analysis for 
Equal Protection Claims of Gender Discrimination in Educational and Vocational Programming 
at Women’s Prisons, 5 Temple Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (1995) (same).  Because the 
plaintiffs here satisfy the threshold test we have followed in the past, the outcome in this 
case would not be affected by abandoning that test now.  Therefore, we leave to future 
parties the task of arguing the applicability of the threshold similarly situated analysis in 
future cases.   
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The County initially points out that section 595.2 does not explicitly 
refer to “sexual orientation” and does not inquire into whether either 
member of a proposed civil marriage is sexually attracted to the other.  
Consequently, it seizes on these observations to support its claim that the 
statute does not establish a classification on the basis of sexual orientation 
because the same-sex civil marriage ban does not grant or withhold the 
benefits flowing from the statute based on sexual preference.  Instead, the 
County argues, section 595.2 only incidentally impacts disparately upon gay 
and lesbian people.   
The County’s position reveals the importance of accurately and 
precisely defining the classification in analyzing all equal protection 
challenges.  The manner in which a classification is defined impacts the 
utility of an equal protection analysis as a means of revealing discrimination.  
Therefore, it is critical that a court reviewing the statute identify the true 
nature of the classification. 
It is true the marriage statute does not expressly prohibit gay and 
lesbian persons from marrying; it does, however, require that if they marry, 
it must be to someone of the opposite sex.  Viewed in the complete context of 
marriage, including intimacy, civil marriage with a person of the opposite sex 
is as unappealing to a gay or lesbian person as civil marriage with a person 
of the same sex is to a heterosexual.  Thus, the right of a gay or lesbian 
person under the marriage statute to enter into a civil marriage only with a 
person of the opposite sex is no right at all.  Under such a law, gay or 
lesbian individuals cannot simultaneously fulfill their deeply felt need for a 
committed personal relationship, as influenced by their sexual orientation, 
and gain the civil status and attendant benefits granted by the statute.  
Instead, a gay or lesbian person can only gain the same rights under the 
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statute as a heterosexual person by negating the very trait that defines gay 
and lesbian people as a class—their sexual orientation.  In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 441.  The benefit denied by the marriage statute—the 
status of civil marriage for same-sex couples—is so “closely correlated with 
being homosexual” as to make it apparent the law is targeted at gay and 
lesbian people as a class.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583, 123 S. Ct. at 
2486, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 529 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing 
criminalization of homosexual sodomy and concluding that “[w]hile it is true 
that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is 
conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual.  Under such 
circumstances, [the] sodomy law is targeted at more than conduct.  It is 
instead directed toward gay persons as a class.”).  The Court’s decision in 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996), 
supports this conclusion.  Romer can be read to imply that sexual 
orientation is a trait that defines an individual and is not merely a means to 
associate a group with a type of behavior.  See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 116 
S. Ct. at 1627, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 865–66 (holding an amendment to a state 
constitution pertaining to “homosexual . . . orientation” expresses “animus 
toward the class that it affects”).   
By purposefully placing civil marriage outside the realistic reach of gay 
and lesbian individuals, the ban on same-sex civil marriages differentiates 
implicitly on the basis of sexual orientation.  See Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 431 
n.24; Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 605 (Md. 2007).  Thus, we proceed 
to analyze the constitutionality of the statute based on sexual orientation 
discrimination.   
F.  Framework for Determining Appropriate Level of Judicial 
Scrutiny.  Our determination that the marriage statute employs a sexual-
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orientation-based classification does not, of course, control the outcome of 
our equal protection inquiry.  Most statutes, one way or the other, create 
classifications.  Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967, 102 S. Ct. 2836, 
2845, 73 L. Ed. 2d 508, 518 (1982) (“Classification is the essence of all 
legislation, and only those classifications which are invidious, arbitrary, or 
irrational offend the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.”).  To 
determine if this particular classification violates constitutional principles of 
equal protection, we must next ask what level of scrutiny applies to 
classifications of this type.  The County argues the more deferential rational 
basis test should apply, while plaintiffs argue closer scrutiny is appropriate.   
Although neither we nor the United States Supreme Court has decided 
which level of scrutiny applies to legislative classifications based on sexual 
orientation, numerous Supreme Court equal protection cases provide a 
general framework to guide our analysis under the Iowa Constitution.10  To 
say a general framework exists is not to say the Supreme Court has provided 
a precise formula for determining when legislative action is subject to a 
                                       
10In the past, when a dispute has required this court to choose which level of 
scrutiny to apply to a given classification, the United States Supreme Court has already 
determined the appropriate level of scrutiny under the Federal Equal Protection Clause.  
See, e.g., In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 452–53 (Iowa 2001) (relying on Supreme 
Court’s decision that the mentally ill do not comprise a suspect class); Bennett v. City of 
Redfield, 446 N.W.2d 467, 473 (Iowa 1989) (deferring to Supreme Court precedent to 
determine employees of city governments do not comprise a suspect class).  We have 
routinely followed the Supreme Court’s lead, and as a result we have not previously 
developed an independent analysis under the Iowa Constitution.  See, e.g., Williams, 628 
N.W.2d at 452–53 (noting Supreme Court holding and containing no independent analysis); 
Gilleland v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 524 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Iowa 1994) (stating “strict scrutiny 
analysis only required in few cases involving suspect classes and fundamental rights as 
defined by Supreme Court”); Bennett, 446 N.W.2d at 473 (noting Supreme Court holding 
and containing no independent analysis); Stracke v. City of Council Bluffs, 341 N.W.2d 731, 
734 (Iowa 1983) (“Because no fundamental right or suspect class, as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court, is involved in this case, our task is to determine whether a rational 
basis existed . . . .”).  While we again note our authority to develop independent analyses 
under the Iowa Constitution, we nonetheless view the Supreme Court’s general framework 




heightened form of scrutiny.  See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 472 n.24, 
105 S. Ct. at 3272 n.24, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 341 n.24 (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“No single talisman can define those groups 
likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny; 
experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide.”); Conaway, 932 
A.2d at 606 (“There is no brightline diagnostic, annunciated by . . . the U.S. 
Supreme Court, by which a suspect or quasi-suspect class may be readily 
recognized.”).  Instead, the Supreme Court has expressed a number of 
general principles to assist in identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
Classifications based on factors like race, alienage, national origin, 
sex, or illegitimacy are “so seldom relevant to achievement of any legitimate 
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to 
reflect prejudice and antipathy.”  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 
S. Ct. at 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320.  Rather than bearing some relationship 
to the burdened class’s ability to contribute to society, such classifications 
often reflect irrelevant stereotypes.  Id. at 440–41, 105 S. Ct. at 3254–55, 87 
L. Ed. 2d at 320–21.  “For these reasons and because such discrimination is 
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means,” laws based on these types 
of classifications must withstand more intense judicial scrutiny than other 
types of classifications.  Id. 
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain 
legislative classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, 
the Supreme Court has looked to four factors.11  Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606 
                                       
11Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Plyler suggests the significance 
of each of the four factors.  Although Plyler does not formulate a specific test, nor even 
discuss “factors” per se, the case touches upon each of the four traditional factors: 
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classifications as 
“suspect.”  Some classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-
34 
 
(discussing factors examined by Supreme Court in considering use of 
heightened scrutiny).  The Supreme Court has considered:  (1) the history of 
invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation;12 (2) 
whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class 
member’s ability to contribute to society;13 (3) whether the distinguishing 
                                 
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legitimate objective.  Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily 
recognized as incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each 
person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the 
law.  Classifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper 
legislative goal.  Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have 
historically been “relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to 
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”  
The experience of our Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in 
the treatment of some groups.  Our response to that experience is reflected in 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Legislation 
imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of 
circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of “class or caste” 
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish. 
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2395 n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14 (citations 
omitted); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (identifying two “required factors” and two 
additional considerations); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 339–40 (D.C. 1995) 
(Ferren, J., dissenting) (identifying four factors and explaining the Supreme Court has not 
applied all four factors in every case).   
12See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531–32, 116 S. Ct. at 2274–75, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 750 
(observing “ ‘long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination’ ” (quoting Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 590 (1973) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion))); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S. Ct. 2727, 2729, 
91 L. Ed. 2d 527, 533 (1986) (noting subject class had “not been subjected to 
discrimination”); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 443, 105 S. Ct. at 3256, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 
332 (mentally retarded not victims of “continuing antipathy or prejudice”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. 
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 525 (1976) 
(considering “ ‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’ ” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 40 (1973)).   
13See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S. Ct. at 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320 
(certain classifications merely “reflect prejudice and antipathy”); Miss. Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982) (“Care 
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and 
stereotypic notions.”); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S. Ct. at 2566, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 525 
(considering whether aged have “been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of 
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities”); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 
93 S. Ct. at 1770, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (“[T]he sex 
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”).   
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characteristic is “immutable” or beyond the class members’ control;14 and (4) 
the political power of the subject class.15  In considering whether sexual 
orientation is a suspect class, a number of our sister jurisdictions have 
referenced similar factors.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442–43; 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426; Conaway, 932 A.2d at 606–07; Andersen v. King 
County, 138 P.3d 963, 974 (Wash. 2006). 
Both parties recognize the relevance of these factors.  They disagree, 
however, over how the factors should be applied to decide whether sexual 
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  The County essentially views 
the factors as elements, asserting each must be fulfilled before we may 
abandon our deferential level of scrutiny.  To this end, the County argues the 
immutability and political powerlessness “elements” are not satisfied in this 
case.   
In its effort to treat the factors as essential elements, the County 
overlooks the flexible manner in which the Supreme Court has applied the 
                                       
14Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S. Ct. at 2729, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (close relatives “do 
not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group”); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S. Ct. at 3255–56, 87 L. Ed. 2d 
at 322 (mentally retarded people are different from other classes of people, “immutably so, 
in relevant respects”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S. Ct. at 2396, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 801 
(children of illegal aliens, unlike their parents, have “legal characteristic[s] over which 
children can have little control”); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 96 S. Ct. 2755, 
2762, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651, 660 (1976) (status of illegitimacy “is, like race or national origin, a 
characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual”); 
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S. Ct. at 1770,  36 L. Ed. 2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion) (“[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth . . . .”).   
15Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S. Ct. at 2729, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (close relatives of 
primary household are “not a minority or politically powerless”); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. at 445, 105 S. Ct. at 3257, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 324 (refusing to find “that the mentally 
retarded are politically powerless”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S. Ct. 
at 1294, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 40 (considering whether minority and poor school children were 
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
36 
 
four factors in the past.16  For purposes of state constitutional analysis, we 
likewise refuse to view all the factors as elements or as individually 
demanding a certain weight in every case.  Instead, we analyze each of the 
four factors and assess how each bears on the question of whether the Iowa 
Constitution requires a more searching scrutiny be applied to the specific 
classification at issue.  We note the first two factors—history of intentional 
discrimination and relationship of classifying characteristic to a person’s 
                                       
16The Supreme Court has not required, nor even discussed, every factor in every 
case.  See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34, 104 S. Ct. 1879, 1882–83, 80 
L. Ed. 2d 421, 426 (1984) (foregoing analysis of political power); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 
1, 9 n.11, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2125 n.11, 53 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71 n.11 (1977) (jettisoning 
immutability requirement and scrutinizing classification of resident aliens closely despite 
aliens’ voluntary status as residents); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505–06, 96 S. Ct. at 2762–63, 
49 L. Ed. 2d at 660–61 (according heightened scrutiny to classifications based on 
illegitimacy despite mutability and political power of illegitimates); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313–
14, 96 S. Ct. at 2567, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 525 (omitting any reference to immutability); San 
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 25, 93 S. Ct. at 1292, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 38 (omitting any 
reference to immutability); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–88, 93 S. Ct. at 1770–71, 36 L. Ed. 2d 
at 591–92 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (scrutinizing classification based on gender 
closely despite political power of women); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72, 91 
S. Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L. Ed. 2d 534, 541–42 (1971) (foregoing analysis of immutability); see 
also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S. Ct. at 2729, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 533 (referring to whether 
members of the class “exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that 
define them as a discrete group” (emphasis added)); Dean, 653 A.2d at 346 (Ferren, J., 
dissenting) (observing Supreme Court has “ ‘never held that only classes with immutable 
traits can be deemed suspect’ ” (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 725 (9th Cir. 
1989) (Norris, J., concurring))).  Some courts view the Supreme Court’s precedent as 
according greater weight to the first two factors, see, e.g., Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426 (“It 
bears emphasis, however, that the United States Supreme Court has placed far greater 
weight—indeed, it invariably has placed dispositive weight—on the first two factors, that is, 
whether the group has been the subject of long-standing and invidious discrimination and 
whether the group’s distinguishing characteristic bears no relation to the ability of the group 
members to perform or function in society.”), or as suggesting the factors are alternative 
means to heightening scrutiny of a legislative classification, id. at 440 (noting “ ‘a suspect 
class is one saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful 
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process’ ” (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. 
at 313, 96 S. Ct. at 2567, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 525) (emphasis added)).  But see Conaway, 932 
A.2d at 609–14 (holding sexual-orientation-based legislation is not entitled to heightened 
scrutiny because gay and lesbian people are not politically powerless, even though other 
factors are satisfied); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 974 (determining plaintiffs failed to show 
homosexuality is an immutable trait and consequently holding sexual-orientation-based 
distinctions do not demand closer judicial scrutiny). 
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ability to contribute—have always been present when heightened scrutiny 
has been applied.  They have been critical to the analysis and could be 
considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or quasi-
suspect class.  However, we consider the last two factors—immutability of 
the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group—to supplement 
the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny 
exists.     
G.  Determination of Appropriate Level of Scrutiny.  Guided by the 
established framework, we next consider each of the four traditional factors 
and assess how each bears on the question of whether the constitution 
demands a more searching scrutiny be applied to the sexual-orientation-
based classification in Iowa’s marriage statute.   
1.  History of discrimination against gay and lesbian people.  The first 
consideration is whether gay and lesbian people have suffered a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation.  The 
County does not, and could not in good faith, dispute the historical reality 
that gay and lesbian people as a group have long been the victim of 
purposeful and invidious discrimination because of their sexual orientation.  
The long and painful history of discrimination against gay and lesbian 
persons is epitomized by the criminalization of homosexual conduct in many 
parts of this country until very recently.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79, 
123 S. Ct. 2483–84, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 520 (invalidating criminalization of 
homosexual sodomy in 2003).  Additionally, only a few years ago persons 
identified as homosexual were dismissed from military service regardless of 
past dedication and demonstrated valor.  Public employees identified as gay 
or lesbian have been thought to pose security risks due to a perceived risk of 
extortion resulting from a threat of public exposure.  School-yard bullies 
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have psychologically ground children with apparently gay or lesbian sexual 
orientation in the cruel mortar and pestle of school-yard prejudice.  At the 
same time, lesbian and gay people continue to be frequent victims of hate 
crimes.  See Criminal Justice Information Servs. Div., FBI, Hate Crime 
Statistics 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/hc2007/victims.htm (according to 
FBI-collected data, the only hate crimes occurring more frequently than 
sexual-orientation-motivated hate crimes are crimes based on race or 
religious bias).   
The Iowa General Assembly has recognized the need to address 
sexual-orientation-based discrimination by including sexual orientation as a 
characteristic protected in the Iowa Civil Rights Act, by defining hate crimes 
to include certain offenses committed because of the victim’s sexual 
orientation, and by prohibiting “harassing or bullying” behavior in schools 
based on sexual orientation.  See Iowa Code §§ 216.2–.18A (Iowa Civil Rights 
Act) (sexual-orientation-based discrimination); id. § 280.28 (school 
harassment and bullying); id. § 729A.2 (hate crimes committed because of 
the victim’s sexual orientation).  These statutory enactments demonstrate a 
legislative recognition of the need to remedy historical sexual-orientation-
based discrimination.17   
In sum, this history of discrimination suggests any legislative burdens 
placed on lesbian and gay people as a class “are more likely than others to 
                                       
17Additional legal authority abounds demonstrating the history of discrimination.  
See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442 (finding “sexual orientation is a 
characteristic . . . that is associated with a stigma of inferiority and second-class citizenship, 
manifested by the group’s history of legal and social disabilities); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432–
33 (concluding gay and lesbian people have “been subjected to and stigmatized by a long 
history of purposeful and invidious discrimination,” and recounting numerous legal and 
scientific authorities); Dean, 653 A.2d at 344–45 (“Discrimination against homosexuals has 
been pervasive in both the public and the private sectors.”); Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609 
(“Homosexual persons have been the object of societal prejudice by private actors as well as 
by the judicial and legislative branches of federal and state governments.”).   
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reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of 
some legitimate objective.”  Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2394 
n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14.  This observation favors an elevated scrutiny 
to uncover any such prejudice. 
2.  Sexual orientation and the ability to contribute to society.  A second 
relevant consideration is whether the characteristic at issue—sexual 
orientation—is related to the person’s ability to contribute to society.  
Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship 
to a person’s ability to contribute to society.  The existence of this factor 
indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and 
prejudice.  Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 453.  A classification unrelated to a 
person’s ability to perform or contribute to society typically reflects 
“prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as 
worthy or deserving as others” or “reflect[s] outmoded notions of the relative 
capabilities of persons with the characteristic.”  Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. at 440–41, 105 S. Ct. at 3254–56, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 320–21.   
Not surprisingly, none of the same-sex marriage decisions from other 
state courts around the nation have found a person’s sexual orientation to 
be indicative of the person’s general ability to contribute to society.18  See, 
                                       
18The County references plaintiffs’ inability to procreate “naturally,” presumably 
pointing out each couple’s inability to procreate without assistance.  Plaintiffs’ inability to 
contribute children to society by procreation through sexual intercourse with each other 
does not dictate the outcome of our consideration under this factor.  The inquiry into gay 
and lesbian people’s ability to contribute to society is a general one, designed to signal 
whether such classifications routinely risk elevating stereotype over ability.  A person’s 
ability to procreate is merely one of many ways in which the person can contribute to 
society.  While the narrower consideration of plaintiffs’ procreative abilities may be relevant 
to whether section 595.2 ultimately passes judicial scrutiny, consideration of those abilities 
is less helpful in determining which level of scrutiny to apply.  That is, the inability of gay 
and lesbian partners to contribute by procreation through sexual intercourse with each 
other does not indicate whether legislative classifications based on sexual preference—which 
can conceivably occur in any legislative subject matter area—will generally be based on 
“stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”  Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 
96 S. Ct. at 2566, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 525. 
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e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 434–36; 
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 345 (D.C. 1995); Conaway, 932 
A.2d at 609.  More importantly, the Iowa legislature has recently declared as 
the public policy of this state that sexual orientation is not relevant to a 
person’s ability to contribute to a number of societal institutions other than 
civil marriage.  See Iowa Code § 216.6 (employment); id. § 216.7 (public 
accommodations); id. § 216.8 (housing); id. § 216.9 (education); id. § 216.10 
(credit practices).19  Significantly, we do not construe Iowa Code chapter 216 
to allow marriage between persons of the same sex, a construction expressly 
forbidden in the Iowa Code.  See id. § 216.18A (“[Chapter 216] shall not be 
                                       
19The legislature has further indicated the irrelevancy of sexual orientation by 
mandating sex education in the state’s public schools be free of biases relating to sexual 
orientation, Iowa Code § 279.50, and by securing personal freedom from violence and 
intimidation due to sexual orientation, id. § 729A.1.  Likewise, numerous state 
administrative regulations indicate sexual orientation is not relevant to a person’s ability to 
contribute to society.  See Iowa Admin. Code r. 191—48.9 (prohibiting discrimination in 
making or solicitation of viatical settlement contracts on basis of sexual orientation); id. r. 
281—12 (preamble) (ensuring access to education meeting child’s needs and abilities 
regardless of sexual orientation); id. r. 281—12.1 (ordering equal opportunity in educational 
programs regardless of sexual orientation); id. r. 281—12.3 (ordering school boards to 
consider the potential disparate impact of student responsibility and discipline policies on 
students because of students’ sexual orientation); id. r. 281—68.4 (prohibiting 
discrimination in admission process to public charter schools based on sexual orientation); 
id. r. 282—25.3 (labeling denial of participation in benefits of educational program based on 
sexual orientation an “unethical practice”); id. r. 282—26.3 (prohibiting licensed educators 
from discriminating based on sexual orientation); id. r. 641—131.7 (allowing public health 
department to take numerous adverse actions against emergency medical care personnel 
who “practice, condone, or facilitate” discrimination against a patient on the basis of sexual 
orientation); id. r. 641—131.8 (allowing public health department to take numerous adverse 
actions against training program or continuing education providers who “practice, condone, 
or facilitate” discrimination against a patient on the basis of sexual orientation); id. r. 641—
132.10 (allowing denial, probation, revocation, and suspension of authorized emergency 
medical service programs that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation); id. r. 645—
282.2 (prohibiting licensed social workers from discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation); id. r. 645—363.2 (providing that sexual-orientation-based discrimination by 
sign language interpreters or transliterators is unethical); id. r. 657—3.28 (providing that 
sexual-orientation–based discrimination by pharmacy technicians is unethical); id. r. 657—
8.11 (same for licensed pharmacies, licensed pharmacists, and registered pharmacist-
interns); id. r. 661—81.2 (prohibiting entrance of information regarding sexual orientation 
into Iowa law enforcement intelligence network information system in most circumstances).  
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construed to allow marriage between persons of the same sex, in accordance 
with chapter 595.”).  Rather, we merely highlight the reality that chapter 216 
and numerous other statutes and regulations demonstrate sexual 
orientation is broadly recognized in Iowa to be irrelevant to a person’s ability 
to contribute to society.20  Those statutes and regulations reflect at least 
some measure of legislative and executive awareness that discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is often predicated on prejudice and stereotype 
and further express a desire to remove sexual orientation as an obstacle to 
the ability of gay and lesbian people to achieve their full potential.  Therefore, 
we must scrutinize more closely those classifications that suggest a law may 
be based on prejudice and stereotype because laws of that nature are 
“incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to 
be judged individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law.”  Plyler, 
457 U.S. at 217 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2394 n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14.  
Thus, although we do not interpret chapter 216 to allow same-sex marriage, 
we rely on the legislative judgment underlying chapter 216 to determine the 
appropriate level of scrutiny when sexual orientation is the basis for a 
statutory classification.  Based on Iowa statutes and regulations, it is clear 
sexual orientation is no longer viewed in Iowa as an impediment to the 
ability of a person to contribute to society. 
3.  Immutability of sexual orientation.  The parties, consistent with the 
same-sex-marriage scholarship, opinions, and jurisprudence, contest 
                                       
20Other federal and state authority supports such a conclusion.  See Kerrigan, 957 
A.2d at 435 (relying on Connecticut statutes banning discrimination based on sexual 
orientation “in every important economic and social institution and activity that the 
government regulates”); cf. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687, 93 S. Ct. at 1771, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 592 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (interpreting congressional protections against gender 
discrimination as suggesting legislative determination such classifications are “inherently 
invidious” and implying significance of “conclusion of coequal branch of Government” in 
deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny).  
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whether sexual orientation is immutable or unresponsive to attempted 
change.  The County seizes on this debate to argue the summary judgment 
granted by the district court in this case was improper because plaintiffs 
could not prove, as a matter of fact, that sexuality is immutable.  This 
argument, however, essentially limits the constitutional relevance of 
mutability to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class 
is absolutely impervious to change.  To evaluate this argument, we must first 
consider the rationale for using immutability as a factor.   
 A human trait that defines a group is “immutable” when the trait 
exists “solely by the accident of birth,” Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
686, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1770, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 591 (1973) (Brennan, J., 
plurality opinion), or when the person with the trait has no ability to change 
it, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2784, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 750, 815 (1978).  Immutability is a factor in determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny because the inability of a person to change a 
characteristic that is used to justify different treatment makes the 
discrimination violative of the rather “ ‘basic concept of our system that legal 
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.’ ”  
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S. Ct. at 1770, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 591 (Brennan, 
J., plurality opinion) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 
175, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 1407, 31 L. Ed. 2d 768, 779 (1972)); accord Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 217 n.14, 102 S. Ct. at 2394 n.14, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 799 n.14 
(“Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of 
circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class or caste’ 
treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”).  Put 
another way, when a characteristic is immutable, different treatment based 
on this characteristic seems “all the more invidious and unfair.”  Nan D. 
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Hunter, The Sex Discrimination Argument in Gay Rights Cases, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 
397, 403 (2001).  Additionally, immutability can relate to the scope and 
permanency of the barrier imposed on the group.  Temporary barriers tend 
to be less burdensome on a group and more likely to actually advance a 
legitimate governmental interest.  Consequently, such barriers normally do 
not warrant heightened scrutiny.  See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406, 95 
S. Ct. 553, 561, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 544–45 (1975) (one-year residency 
requirement for divorce permitted in part because the constraint was only 
temporary); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 2236, 37 
L. Ed. 2d 63, 72 (1973) (bona fide state resident requirement for college 
tuition permissible when students are provided an opportunity to prove they 
have become residents).  The permanency of the barrier also depends on the 
ability of the individual to change the characteristic responsible for the 
discrimination.  This aspect of immutability may separate truly victimized 
individuals from those who have invited discrimination by changing 
themselves so as to be identified with the group.  As implied by Justice 
Ferren, in dissent, in Dean:   
The degree to which an individual controls, or cannot 
avoid, the acquisition of the defining trait, and the relative ease 
or difficulty with which a trait can be changed, are relevant to 
whether a classification is “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” because 
this inquiry is one way of asking whether someone, rather than 
being victimized, has voluntarily joined a persecuted group and 
thereby invited the discrimination. 
653 A.2d at 346 (Ferren, J., dissenting). 
Importantly, this background reveals courts need not definitively 
resolve the nature-versus-nurture debate currently raging over the origin of 
sexual orientation in order to decide plaintiffs’ equal protection claims.  The 
constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to those 
instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely 
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impossible to change.  Compare Sherman, 576 N.W.2d at 317 (suggesting 
heightened scrutiny is applicable to gender classifications), with Iowa Code 
§ 144.23 (providing legal procedure to obtain new birth certificate indicating 
change in gender).  That is, we agree with those courts that have held the 
immutability “prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when . . . 
the identifying trait is ‘so central to a person’s identity that it would be 
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it].’ ”  
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438 (quoting Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 
(9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442 (“Because a person’s sexual orientation is 
so integral an aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a 
person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid 
discriminatory treatment.”).  
In this case, the County acknowledges sexual orientation is highly 
resistant to change.  Additionally, “sexual orientation ‘forms a significant 
part of a person’s identity.’ ”  Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 438 (quoting Able v. 
United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev’d on other 
grounds, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998)).  Sexual orientation influences the 
formation of personal relationships between all people—heterosexual, gay, or 
lesbian—to fulfill each person’s fundamental needs for love and attachment.  
Accordingly, because sexual orientation is central to personal identity and 
“ ‘may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the 
individual’s sense of self,’ ” classifications based on sexual orientation “are 
no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than 
any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable 
characteristic.”  Id. at 438–39 (quoting Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 
1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992)).  
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Sexual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax 
their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to 
self-help.   
4.  Political powerlessness of lesbian and gay people.  As observed, the 
political power of the burdened class has been referenced repeatedly in 
Supreme Court cases determining the level of scrutiny to be applied to a 
given piece of legislation.  Unfortunately, the Court has never defined what it 
means to be politically powerless for purposes of this analysis, nor has it 
quantified a maximum amount of political power a group may enjoy while 
still receiving the protection from unfair discrimination accompanying 
heightened scrutiny.  The County points to the numerous legal protections 
gay and lesbian people have secured against discrimination, and the County 
argues those protections demonstrate gay and lesbian people are not a 
politically powerless class.  The County’s argument implies gay and lesbian 
people must be characterized by a complete, or nearly complete, lack of 
political power before courts should subject sexual-orientation-based 
legislative burdens to a heightened scrutiny.   
Notwithstanding the lack of a mathematical equation to guide the 
analysis of this factor, a number of helpful general principles related to the 
political power of suspect classes can be culled from the Supreme Court’s 
cases.  First, these cases show absolute political powerlessness is not 
necessary to subject legislative burdens on a certain class to heightened 
scrutiny.  For example, females enjoyed at least some measure of political 
power when the Supreme Court first heightened its scrutiny of gender 
classifications.  See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685–88 & n.17, 93 S. Ct. at 1769–
72 & n.17, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 591–92 & n.17 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) 
(subjecting gender classifications to heightened scrutiny after observing Civil 
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Rights Act of 1964 and Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibited sex discrimination 
and noting “the position of women in America [had] improved markedly” by 
1973 such that “women [did] not constitute a small and powerless 
minority”). 
Second, Supreme Court jurisprudence establishes that a group’s 
current political powerlessness is not a prerequisite to enhanced judicial 
protection.  “[I]f a group’s current political powerlessness [was] a prerequisite 
to a characteristic’s being considered a constitutionally suspect basis for 
differential treatment, it would be impossible to justify the numerous 
decisions that continue to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect 
classifications.”  In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 443.  Race continues to 
be a suspect classification, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326, 123 S. Ct. 
2325, 2337, 156 L. Ed. 2d 304, 331 (2003), even though racial minorities 
enjoy growing political power.21  Likewise, gender classifications receive 
various forms of heightened scrutiny, even though women continue to gain 
political power.  See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33, 116 S. Ct. at 2275, 
135 L. Ed. 2d at 751–52 (applying intermediate scrutiny). 
While a more in-depth discussion of the history of the political-power 
factor is possible, see Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 439–44, we are satisfied, for the 
purpose of analyzing the Iowa Constitution, the political powerlessness 
factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute 
political powerlessness.  Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be 
“whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end 
                                       
21By one measure—occupation of public office—the political power of racial 
minorities is unbounded in this country today.  This fact was on display January 20, 2009, 
when Barack H. Obama, the African-American son of a native Kenyan, was inaugurated as 
the forty-fourth President of the United States of America.   
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to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.”  Id. 
at 444.   
It is also important to observe that the political power of gays and 
lesbians, while responsible for greater acceptance and decreased 
discrimination, has done little to remove barriers to civil marriage.  Although 
a small number of state legislatures have approved civil unions for gay and 
lesbian people without judicial intervention, no legislature has secured the 
right to civil marriage for gay and lesbian people without court order.22  The 
myriad statutes and regulatory protections against discrimination based on 
sexual orientation in such areas as employment, housing, public 
accommodations, and education have not only been absent in the area of 
marriage, but legislative bodies have taken affirmative steps to shore up the 
concept of traditional marriage by specifically excluding gays and lesbians.  
Like Iowa, over forty other states have passed statutes or constitutional 
amendments to ban same-sex marriages.  See Ben Schuman, Note, Gods & 
Gays:  Analyzing the Same-Sex Marriage Debate From a Religious Perspective, 
96 Geo. L.J. 2103, 2107–08 (2008) (recognizing forty-two states with laws 
prohibiting same-sex marriage as of November 8, 2007) [hereinafter 
Schuman]; Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions (2008), 
available at http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage_prohibitions.pdf 
(mapping states’ enactment of marriage prohibitions).  Thus, although equal 
rights for gays and lesbians have been increasingly recognized in the political 
                                       
22See Misha Isaak, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”:  Civil Unions & the Constitutional 
Significance of “Marriage,” 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 607, 608 & n.7 (2008) [hereinafter Isaak] 
(noting limited success in obtaining legal status for same-sex marriage, including passage of 
same-sex civil unions in only two states and same-sex civil marriage in only one); Justin 
Reinheimer, What Lawrence Should Have Said:  Reconstructing an Equality Approach, 96 
Cal. L. Rev. 505, 516–17 & n.46 (2008) (reviewing status of state laws relating to legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships and noting only the California legislature has (twice) 




arena, the right to civil marriage is a notable exception to this trend.  
Consequently, the specific right sought in this case has largely lacked any 
extensive political support and has actually experienced an affirmative 
backlash.   
We are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically powerful 
as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests 
produces discrimination based on sexual orientation.  Gays and lesbians 
certainly possess no more political power than women enjoyed four decades 
ago when the Supreme Court began subjecting gender-based legislation to 
closer scrutiny.  Additionally, gay and lesbian people are, as a class, 
currently no more powerful than women or members of some racial 
minorities.  These facts demonstrate, at the least, the political-power factor 
does not weigh against heightened judicial scrutiny of sexual-orientation-
based legislation. 
 5.  Classifications based on sexual orientation demand closer scrutiny.  
In summarizing the rationale supporting heightened scrutiny of legislation 
classifying on the basis of sexual orientation, it would be difficult to improve 
upon the words of the Supreme Court of Connecticut:   
Gay persons have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long 
history of purposeful and invidious discrimination that 
continues to manifest itself in society. The characteristic that 
defines the members of this group—attraction to persons of the 
same sex—bears no logical relationship to their ability to 
perform in society, either in familial relations or otherwise as 
productive citizens. Because sexual orientation is such an 
essential component of personhood, even if there is some 
possibility that a person’s sexual preference can be altered, it 
would be wholly unacceptable for the state to require anyone to 
do so. Gay persons also represent a distinct minority of the 
population. It is true, of course, that gay persons recently have 
made significant advances in obtaining equal treatment under 
the law. Nonetheless, we conclude that, as a minority group that 
continues to suffer the enduring effects of centuries of legally 
sanctioned discrimination, laws singling them out for disparate 
treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure 
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that those laws are not the product of such historical prejudice 
and stereotyping. 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432.  But see Conaway, 932 A.2d at 609–14 (holding 
sexual-orientation-based legislation is not entitled to heightened scrutiny 
because lesbian and gay people are not politically powerless); Andersen, 138 
P.3d at 974 (determining plaintiffs failed to satisfy burden to prove 
homosexuality is not an immutable trait and consequently holding sexual-
orientation-based distinctions do not demand closer judicial scrutiny).  We 
agree with the observations of the Connecticut Supreme Court.  The factors 
established to guide our determination of the level of scrutiny to utilize in 
our examination of the equal protection claim in this case all point to an 
elevated level of scrutiny.  Accordingly, we hold that legislative classifications 
based on sexual orientation must be examined under a heightened level of 
scrutiny under the Iowa Constitution. 
H.  Application of Heightened Scrutiny.  Plaintiffs argue sexual-
orientation-based statutes should be subject to the most searching scrutiny.  
The County asserts Iowa’s marriage statute, section 595.2, may be reviewed, 
at most, according to an intermediate level of scrutiny.  Because we conclude 
Iowa’s same-sex marriage statute cannot withstand intermediate scrutiny, 
we need not decide whether classifications based on sexual orientation are 
subject to a higher level of scrutiny.  Thus, we turn to a discussion of the 
intermediate scrutiny standard.23  
                                       
23Plaintiffs and some amici urge us to abandon the traditional tiered analysis.  This 
view is supported by commentators, at least one of which points out no new suspect or 
quasi-suspect class has been identified since the 1970s and argues the notion of suspect 
classes is a dead letter in federal constitutional law.  See Evan Gerstman, Same Sex 
Marriage & the Constitution 61–63 (2004).  The “rigidified” tiered approach has long had its 
detractors, see, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 98, 93 S. Ct. at 1330, 36 
L. Ed. 2d at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting), and other states have exercised corresponding 
sovereign authority to adopt balancing tests in equal protection cases, see, e.g., State v. 
Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1192–93 (Alaska 1983); Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 
302 (N.J. 1985); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878 (Vt. 1999).  Although a more flexible 
analysis is arguably more reflective of Iowa’s constitutional equality mandates and related 
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1.  Intermediate scrutiny standard.  “To withstand intermediate 
scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substantially related to an 
important governmental objective.”  Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 
S. Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465, 472 (1988).  In applying an 
intermediate standard to review gender-based classifications, the Supreme 
Court has stated:  “Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of 
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine 
whether the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’ ”  Virginia, 518 
U.S. at 532–33, 116 S. Ct. at 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751.  To this end, 
courts evaluate whether the proffered governmental objectives are important 
and whether the statutory classification is “ ‘substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.’ ”  Id. at 533, 116 S. Ct. at 2275, 135 
L. Ed. 2d at 751 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 
102 S. Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982)).   
2.  Statutory classification:  exclusion of gay and lesbian people from 
civil marriage.  To identify the statutory classification, we focus on the 
“differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought.”  Id. 
at 532–33, 116 S. Ct. at 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (considering “categorical 
exclusion” of women from institution of higher education).  Plaintiffs bring 
this lawsuit complaining of their exclusion from the institution of civil 
                                 
jurisprudence, we recognize it is sometimes prudent to delay consideration of a new analysis 
to subsequent cases when the change can be more fully explored.  See RACI II, 675 N.W.2d 
at 6 (“[I]t is prudent to delay any consideration of whether a different analysis is appropriate 
to a case in which this issue was thoroughly briefed and explored.” (citing In re Det. of 
Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n.1 (Iowa 2000)).  And while plaintiffs have urged us to adopt 
a balancing standard, the parties’ application of equal protection principles to the facts of 
this case has focused on the tiered approach.  We also conclude we are able to adequately 
fulfill our “constitutional obligation as the highest court of this sovereign state to determine 
whether the challenged classification violates Iowa’s constitutional equality provision” by 
using the traditional approach in this case.  Id. at 4.  While we once again reaffirm our 
sovereign authority “to employ a different analytical framework under state constitutional 
provisions,” RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 5, we decline to adopt a new approach in this case. 
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marriage.  In response, the County offers support for the legislature’s 
decision to statutorily establish heterosexual civil marriage.  Because the 
relevant focal point is the opportunity sought by the plaintiffs, the issue 
presented by this lawsuit is whether the state has “exceedingly persuasive” 
reasons for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples, not whether state-
sanctioned, heterosexual marriage is constitutional.  See id. at 531, 116 
S. Ct. at 2274, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751.  Thus, the question we must answer is 
whether excluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage is substantially 
related to any important governmental objective. 
 3.  Governmental objectives.  The County has proffered a number of 
objectives supporting the marriage statute.  These objectives include support 
for the “traditional” institution of marriage, the optimal procreation and 
rearing of children, and financial considerations.24 
The first step in scrutinizing a statutory classification can be to 
determine whether the objectives purportedly advanced by the classification 
are important.  “The burden of justification is demanding and it rests 
entirely on the State.”  Id. at 533, 116 S. Ct. at 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751.  
Where we find, or can assume, the proffered governmental interests are 
sufficiently weighty to be called “important,” the critical inquiry is whether 
these governmental objectives can fairly be said to be advanced by the 
legislative classification.  See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank v. Arnold, 426 N.W.2d 
                                       
24Other jurisdictions considering the validity of legislative exclusion of gay and 
lesbian people from civil marriage have considered alternative justifications.  See, e.g., 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 476 (uniformity with laws of other jurisdictions); id. at 518 (Zarella, J., 
dissenting) (regulation of heterosexual procreation); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32–
34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (moral disapproval, uniformity with other 
jurisdictions); Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982 (avoid “the need to resolve the sometimes 
conflicting rights and obligations of the same-sex couple and the necessary third party in 
relation to a child”).  We need not independently analyze these alternative justifications as 
they are not offered to support the Iowa statute.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 116 S. Ct. at 
2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (“The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation.”).   
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153, 156 (Iowa 1988) (“First we must examine the legitimacy of the end to be 
achieved; we then scrutinize the means used to achieve that end.”).  In this 
analysis, we drill down to analyze the “link between classification and 
objective.”  Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 116 S. Ct. at 1627, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 866. 
 a.  Maintaining traditional marriage.  First, the County argues the 
same-sex marriage ban promotes the “integrity of traditional marriage” by 
“maintaining the historical and traditional marriage norm ([as] one between 
a man and a woman).”  This argument is straightforward and has superficial 
appeal.  A specific tradition sought to be maintained cannot be an important 
governmental objective for equal protection purposes, however, when the 
tradition is nothing more than the historical classification currently 
expressed in the statute being challenged.  When a certain tradition is used 
as both the governmental objective and the classification to further that 
objective, the equal protection analysis is transformed into the circular 
question of whether the classification accomplishes the governmental 
objective, which objective is to maintain the classification.  In other words, 
the equal protection clause is converted into a “ ‘barren form of words’ ” 
when “ ‘discrimination . . . is made an end in itself.’ ”  Tussman & tenBroek, 
37 Cal. L. Rev. at 357 (quoting Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S. Ct. 7, 
10, 60 L. Ed. 131, 135 (1915)). 
This precise situation is presented by the County’s claim that the 
statute in this case exists to preserve the traditional understanding of 
marriage.  The governmental objective identified by the County—to maintain 
the traditional understanding of marriage—is simply another way of saying 
the governmental objective is to limit civil marriage to opposite-sex couples.  
Opposite-sex marriage, however, is the classification made under the 
statute, and this classification must comply with our principles of equal 
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protection.  Thus, the use of traditional marriage as both the governmental 
objective and the classification of the statute transforms the equal protection 
analysis into the question of whether restricting marriage to opposite-sex 
couples accomplishes the governmental objective of maintaining opposite-sex 
marriage.   
This approach is, of course, an empty analysis.  It permits a 
classification to be maintained “ ‘for its own sake.’ ”  Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 
478 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S. Ct. at 1629, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 
868).  Moreover, it can allow discrimination to become acceptable as 
tradition and helps to explain how discrimination can exist for such a long 
time.  If a simple showing that discrimination is traditional satisfies equal 
protection, previous successful equal protection challenges of invidious 
racial and gender classifications would have failed.  Consequently, equal 
protection demands that “ ‘the classification ([that is], the exclusion of gay 
[persons] from civil marriage) must advance a state interest that is separate 
from the classification itself.’ ”  Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 
1, 33 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 635, 
116 S. Ct. at 1629, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 868 (rejecting “classification of persons 
undertaken for its own sake”). 
 “[W]hen tradition is offered to justify preserving a statutory scheme 
that has been challenged on equal protection grounds, we must determine 
whether the reasons underlying that tradition are sufficient to satisfy 
constitutional requirements.”  Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478–79 (emphasis 
added).  Thus, we must analyze the legislature’s objective in maintaining the 
traditional classification being challenged. 
 The reasons underlying traditional marriage may include the other 
objectives asserted by the County, objectives we will separately address in 
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this decision.  However, some underlying reason other than the preservation 
of tradition must be identified.25  Because the County offers no particular 
governmental reason underlying the tradition of limiting civil marriage to 
heterosexual couples, we press forward to consider other plausible reasons 
for the legislative classification. 
b.  Promotion of optimal environment to raise children.  Another 
governmental objective proffered by the County is the promotion of “child 
rearing by a father and a mother in a marital relationship which social 
scientists say with confidence is the optimal milieu for child rearing.”  This 
objective implicates the broader governmental interest to promote the best 
interests of children.  The “best interests of children” is, undeniably, an 
important governmental objective.  Yet, we first examine the underlying 
premise proffered by the County that the optimal environment for children is 
to be raised within a marriage of both a mother and a father.   
 Plaintiffs presented an abundance of evidence and research, confirmed 
by our independent research, supporting the proposition that the interests of 
children are served equally by same-sex parents and opposite-sex parents.  
On the other hand, we acknowledge the existence of reasoned opinions that 
dual-gender parenting is the optimal environment for children.  These 
opinions, while thoughtful and sincere, were largely unsupported by reliable 
scientific studies.26 
                                       
25The preservation of traditional marriage could only be a legitimate reason for the 
classification if expanding marriage to include others in its definition would undermine the 
traditional institution.  The County has simply failed to explain how the traditional 
institution of civil marriage would suffer if same-sex civil marriage were allowed.  There is no 
legitimate notion that a more inclusive definition of marriage will transform civil marriage 
into something less than it presently is for heterosexuals.  Benjamin G. Ledsham, Note, 
Means to Legitimate Ends:  Same-Sex Marriage through the Lens of Illegitimacy-Based 
Discrimination, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2373, 2388 (2007). 
26The research appears to strongly support the conclusion that same-sex couples 
foster the same wholesome environment as opposite-sex couples and suggests that the 
traditional notion that children need a mother and a father to be raised into healthy, well-
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Even assuming there may be a rational basis at this time to believe the 
legislative classification advances a legitimate government interest, this 
assumed fact would not be sufficient to survive the equal protection analysis 
applicable in this case.  In order to ensure this classification based on sexual 
orientation is not borne of prejudice and stereotype, intermediate scrutiny 
demands a closer relationship between the legislative classification and the 
purpose of the classification than mere rationality.  Under intermediate 
scrutiny, the relationship between the government’s goal and the 
classification employed to further that goal must be “substantial.”  Clark, 
486 U.S. at 461, 108 S. Ct. at 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 472.  In order to 
evaluate that relationship, it is helpful to consider whether the legislation is 
over-inclusive or under-inclusive.  See RACI II, 675 N.W.2d at 10 
(considering under-inclusion and over-inclusion even in the rational basis 
context).   
A statute is under-inclusive when the classification made in the 
statute “does not include all who are similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of the law.”  Tussman & tenBroek, 37 Cal. L. Rev. at 348.  An 
under-inclusive statute means all people included in the statutory 
classification have the trait that is relevant to the aim of the statute, but 
other people with the trait are not included in the classification.  See id.  A 
statute is over-inclusive when the classification made in the statute includes 
more persons than those who are similarly situated with respect to the 
purpose of the law.  See id. at 351.  An over-inclusive statute “imposes a 
burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of 
those” with the trait relevant to the aim of the law.  Id.  As the degree to 
                                 
adjusted adults is based more on stereotype than anything else.  In any event, we do not 
address whether there is a rational basis for the marriage statute, as the sexual-orientation 
classification made by the statute is subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny. 
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which a statutory classification is shown to be over-inclusive or under-
inclusive increases, so does the difficulty in demonstrating the classification 
substantially furthers the legislative goal. 
We begin with the County’s argument that the goal of the same-sex 
marriage ban is to ensure children will be raised only in the optimal milieu.  
In pursuit of this objective, the statutory exclusion of gay and lesbian people 
is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.  The civil marriage statute is 
under-inclusive because it does not exclude from marriage other groups of 
parents—such as child abusers, sexual predators, parents neglecting to 
provide child support, and violent felons—that are undeniably less than 
optimal parents.  Such under-inclusion tends to demonstrate that the 
sexual-orientation-based classification is grounded in prejudice or 
“overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences” of gay and lesbian people, rather than having a substantial 
relationship to some important objective.  See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533, 116 
S. Ct. at 2275, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 751 (rejecting use of overbroad 
generalizations to classify).  If the marriage statute was truly focused on 
optimal parenting, many classifications of people would be excluded, not 
merely gay and lesbian people. 
Of course, “[r]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to 
the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.”  
Knepper v. Monticello State Bank, 450 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Iowa 1990) (citing 
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S. Ct. 461, 465, 99 
L. Ed. 563, 573 (1955)).  Thus, “[t]he legislature may select one phase of one 
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”  Williamson, 348 U.S. 
at 489, 75 S. Ct. at 465, 99 L. Ed. at 573.  While a statute does not 
automatically violate equal protection merely by being under-inclusive, the 
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degree of under-inclusion nonetheless indicates the substantiality of the 
relationship between the legislative means and end. 
As applied to this case, it could be argued the same-sex marriage ban 
is just one legislative step toward ensuring the optimal environment for 
raising children.  Under this argument, the governmental objective is slightly 
more modest.  It seeks to reduce the number of same-sex parent households, 
nudging our state a step closer to providing the asserted optimal milieu for 
children.  Even evaluated in light of this narrower objective, however, the 
ban on same-sex marriage is flawed. 
The ban on same-sex marriage is substantially over-inclusive because 
not all same-sex couples choose to raise children.  Yet, the marriage statute 
denies civil marriage to all gay and lesbian people in order to discourage the 
limited number of same-sex couples who desire to raise children.  In doing 
so, the legislature includes a consequential number of “individuals within 
the statute’s purview who are not afflicted with the evil the statute seeks to 
remedy.”  Conaway, 932 A.2d at 649 (Raker, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting).   
At the same time, the exclusion of gay and lesbian people from 
marriage is under-inclusive, even in relation to the narrower goal of 
improving child rearing by limiting same-sex parenting.  Quite obviously, the 
statute does not prohibit same-sex couples from raising children.  Same-sex 
couples currently raise children in Iowa, even while being excluded from civil 
marriage, and such couples will undoubtedly continue to do so.  Recognition 
of this under-inclusion puts in perspective just how minimally the same-sex 
marriage ban actually advances the purported legislative goal.  A law so 
simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive is not substantially 
related to the government’s objective.  In the end, a careful analysis of the 
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over- and under-inclusiveness of the statute reveals it is less about using 
marriage to achieve an optimal environment for children and more about 
merely precluding gay and lesbian people from civil marriage.   
If the statute was truly about the best interest of children, some 
benefit to children derived from the ban on same-sex civil marriages would 
be observable.  Yet, the germane analysis does not show how the best 
interests of children of gay and lesbian parents, who are denied an 
environment supported by the benefits of marriage under the statute, are 
served by the ban.  Likewise, the exclusion of gays and lesbians from 
marriage does not benefit the interests of those children of heterosexual 
parents, who are able to enjoy the environment supported by marriage with 
or without the inclusion of same-sex couples.   
The ban on same-sex civil marriage can only logically be justified as a 
means to ensure the asserted optimal environment for raising children if 
fewer children will be raised within same-sex relationships27 or more 
children will be raised in dual-gender marriages.  Yet, the same-sex-marriage 
ban will accomplish these outcomes only when people in same-sex 
relationships choose not to raise children without the benefit of marriage or 
when children are adopted by dual-gender couples who would have been 
adopted by same-sex couples but for the same-sex civil marriage ban.  We 
discern no substantial support for this proposition.  These outcomes, at 
best, are minimally advanced by the classification.  Consequently, a 
classification that limits civil marriage to opposite-sex couples is simply not 
substantially related to the objective of promoting the optimal environment 
                                       
27The County does not specifically contend the goal of Iowa’s marriage statute is to 
deter gay and lesbian couples from having children.  Such a claim would raise serious due 
process concerns.  See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 
L. Ed. 2d 349, 362 (1972) (noting due process concern with governmental interference with 
decision to conceive children). 
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to raise children.  This conclusion suggests stereotype and prejudice, or 
some other unarticulated reason, could be present to explain the real 
objectives of the statute.   
c.  Promotion of procreation.  The County also proposes that 
government endorsement of traditional civil marriage will result in more 
procreation.  It points out that procreation is important to the continuation 
of the human race, and opposite-sex couples accomplish this objective 
because procreation occurs naturally within this group.  In contrast, the 
County points out, same-sex couples can procreate only through assisted 
reproductive techniques, and some same-sex couples may choose not to 
procreate.  While heterosexual marriage does lead to procreation, the 
argument by the County fails to address the real issue in our required 
analysis of the objective:  whether exclusion of gay and lesbian individuals 
from the institution of civil marriage will result in more procreation?  If 
procreation is the true objective, then the proffered classification must work 
to achieve that objective.   
Conceptually, the promotion of procreation as an objective of marriage 
is compatible with the inclusion of gays and lesbians within the definition of 
marriage.  Gay and lesbian persons are capable of procreation.  Thus, the 
sole conceivable avenue by which exclusion of gay and lesbian people from 
civil marriage could promote more procreation is if the unavailability of civil 
marriage for same-sex partners caused homosexual individuals to “become” 
heterosexual in order to procreate within the present traditional institution 
of civil marriage.  The briefs, the record, our research, and common sense do 
not suggest such an outcome.  Even if possibly true, the link between 
exclusion of gay and lesbian people from marriage and increased procreation 
is far too tenuous to withstand heightened scrutiny.  Specifically, the statute 
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is significantly under-inclusive with respect to the objective of increasing 
procreation because it does not include a variety of groups that do not 
procreate for reasons such as age, physical disability, or choice.  In other 
words, the classification is not substantially related to the asserted 
legislative purpose. 
 d.  Promoting stability in opposite-sex relationships.  A fourth suggested 
rationale supporting the marriage statute is “promoting stability in opposite 
sex relationships.”  While the institution of civil marriage likely encourages 
stability in opposite-sex relationships, we must evaluate whether excluding 
gay and lesbian people from civil marriage encourages stability in opposite-
sex relationships.  The County offers no reasons that it does, and we can 
find none.  The stability of opposite-sex relationships is an important 
governmental interest, but the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
is not substantially related to that objective.   
e.  Conservation of resources.  The conservation of state resources is 
another objective arguably furthered by excluding gay and lesbian persons 
from civil marriage.  The argument is based on a simple premise:  couples 
who are married enjoy numerous governmental benefits, so the state’s fiscal 
burden associated with civil marriage is reduced if less people are allowed to 
marry.  In the common sense of the word, then, it is “rational” for the 
legislature to seek to conserve state resources by limiting the number of 
couples allowed to form civil marriages.  By way of example, the County 
hypothesizes that, due to our laws granting tax benefits to married couples, 
the State of Iowa would reap less tax revenue if individual taxpaying gay and 
lesbian people were allowed to obtain a civil marriage.  Certainly, Iowa’s 
marriage statute causes numerous government benefits, including tax 
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benefits, to be withheld from plaintiffs.28  Thus, the ban on same-sex 
marriages may conserve some state resources.  Excluding any group from 
civil marriage—African-Americans, illegitimates, aliens, even red-haired 
individuals—would conserve state resources in an equally “rational” way.  
Yet, such classifications so obviously offend our society’s collective sense of 
equality that courts have not hesitated to provide added protections against 
such inequalities.   
One primary requirement of the equal protection clause is a more 
substantial relationship between the legislative goal and the means used to 
attain the goal.  When heightened scrutiny is applicable, the means must 
substantially further the legislative end.  Consequently, in this case, the 
sexual-orientation-based classification must substantially further the 
conservation-of-resources objective.   
As observed in our analysis of the other reasons offered in support of 
the marriage statute, significant degrees of over-inclusion and under-
                                       
28Plaintiffs identify over two hundred Iowa statutes affected by civil-marriage status.  
See, e.g., Iowa Code § 85.31 (dependent surviving spouse receives benefits when spouse 
death caused by work injury); id. § 135J.1(4) (hospice patient’s family includes spouse); id. 
§ 142C.4 (spouse has power to make decision concerning anatomical gifts); id. § 144A.7 
(patient’s spouse determines application of life-sustaining procedures in absence of 
declaration); id. § 144C.5 (surviving spouse controls disposition of decedent’s remains in 
absence of declaration); id. § 252A.3(1) (spouse liable for support of other spouse); id. 
§ 252A.3(4) (children of married parents legitimate); id. § 422.7 (spouses may file joint tax 
return); id. § 422.9(1) (optional standard deduction for married taxpayers); id. § 422.12(1)(b) 
(spouses eligible for personal exemption credit); id. § 450.3 (inheritance rights of surviving 
spouses); id. § 450.9 (surviving spouse exempt from inheritance tax on property passed from 
decedent spouse); id. § 450.10(6) (spousal allowance for surviving spouse); id. § 523I.309 
(surviving spouse must consent to decedent spouse’s interment); id. § 613.15 (spouse may 
recover value of services and support of decedent spouse for wrongful death or negligent 
injury); id. § 622.9 (restriction of testimony of communication between husband and wife); 
id. § 633.211(1) (surviving spouse receives decedent spouse’s entire estate in intestacy); id. 
§ 633.236 (surviving spouse has right to elective share); id. § 633.272 (surviving spouse 
takes under partial intestacy if elective share not exercised); id. § 633.336 (damages for 
wrongful death).  The Government Accounting Office, as of 2005, had identified more than 
1000 federal legal rights and responsibilities derived from marriage.  Isaak, 10 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. at 607 n.6.  
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inclusion shed light on the true relationship between exclusion of gay and 
lesbian people from civil marriage and the goal of conserving governmental 
resources.  Exclusion of all same-sex couples is an extremely blunt 
instrument for conserving state resources through limiting access to civil 
marriage.  In other words, the exclusion of same-sex couples is over-
inclusive because many same-sex couples, if allowed to marry, would not 
use more state resources than they currently consume as unmarried 
couples.  To reference the County’s example, while many heterosexual 
couples who have obtained a civil marriage do not file joint tax returns—or 
experience any other tax benefit from marital status—many same-sex 
couples may not file a joint tax return either.  The two classes created by the 
statute—opposite-sex couples and same-sex couples—may use the same 
amount of state resources.  Thus, the two classes are similarly situated for 
the purpose of conserving state resources, yet the classes are treated 
differently by the law.  In this way, sexual orientation is a flawed indicator of 
resource usage.   
Just as exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is a blunt 
instrument, however, it is also significantly undersized if the true goal is to 
conserve state resources.  That is to say, the classification is under-
inclusive.  The goal of conservation of state resources would be equally 
served by excluding any similar-sized group from civil marriage.  Indeed, 
under the County’s logic, more state resources would be conserved by 
excluding groups more numerous than Iowa’s estimated 5800 same-sex 
couples (for example, persons marrying for a second or subsequent time).  
Importantly, there is also no suggestion same-sex couples would use more 
state resources if allowed to obtain a civil marriage than heterosexual 
couples who obtain a civil marriage.   
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Such over-inclusion and under-inclusion demonstrates the trait of 
sexual orientation is a poor proxy for regulating aspiring spouses’ usage of 
state resources.  This tenuous relationship between the classification and its 
purpose demonstrates many people who are similarly situated with respect 
to the purpose of the law are treated differently.  As a result, the sexual-
orientation-based classification does not substantially further the suggested 
governmental interest, as required by intermediate scrutiny. 
4.  Conclusion.  Having examined each proffered governmental 
objective through the appropriate lens of intermediate scrutiny, we conclude 
the sexual-orientation-based classification under the marriage statute does 
not substantially further any of the objectives.  While the objectives asserted 
may be important (and many undoubtedly are important), none are 
furthered in a substantial way by the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
civil marriage.  Our equal protection clause requires more than has been 
offered to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban 
under the statute. 
 I.  Religious Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage.  Now that we have 
addressed and rejected each specific interest advanced by the County to 
justify the classification drawn under the statute, we consider the reason for 
the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage left unspoken by 
the County:  religious opposition to same-sex marriage.  The County’s silence 
reflects, we believe, its understanding this reason cannot, under our Iowa 
Constitution, be used to justify a ban on same-sex marriage.   
 While unexpressed, religious sentiment most likely motivates many, if 
not most, opponents of same-sex civil marriage and perhaps even shapes the 
views of those people who may accept gay and lesbian unions but find the 
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notion of same-sex marriage unsettling.29  Consequently, we address the 
religious undercurrent propelling the same-sex marriage debate as a means 
to fully explain our rationale for rejecting the dual-gender requirement of the 
marriage statute.   
 It is quite understandable that religiously motivated opposition to 
same-sex civil marriage shapes the basis for legal opposition to same-sex 
marriage, even if only indirectly.  Religious objections to same-sex marriage 
are supported by thousands of years of tradition and biblical 
interpretation.30  The belief that the “sanctity of marriage” would be 
undermined by the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples bears a striking 
conceptual resemblance to the expressed secular rationale for maintaining 
the tradition of marriage as a union between dual-gender couples, but better 
identifies the source of the opposition.  Whether expressly or impliedly, 
much of society rejects same-sex marriage due to sincere, deeply ingrained—
even fundamental—religious belief. 
 Yet, such views are not the only religious views of marriage.  As 
demonstrated by amicus groups, other equally sincere groups and people in 
                                       
29A survey in the Des Moines Register in 2008 found 28.1% of individuals surveyed 
supported same-sex marriage, 30.2% opposed same-sex marriage but supported civil 
unions, and thirty-two percent of respondents opposed both same-sex marriage and civil 
unions.  Erin Jordan, About 6 in 10 Iowans back same-sex unions, poll finds, Des Moines 
Register, Nov. 26, 2008, at 4B.  The Des Moines Register survey is consistent with a national 
survey by the PEW Research Center in 2003.  This PEW survey found that fifty-nine percent 
of Americans oppose same-sex marriage, and thirty-two percent favor same-sex marriage.  
Schuman, 96 Geo. L.J. at 2108.  However, opposition to same-sex marriage jumped to 
eighty percent for people “with a high level of religious commitment,” with only twelve 
percent of such people in favor of same-sex marriage.  Id.  
30Schuman, 96 Geo. L.J. at 2109–12 (discussing the religious arguments against 
same-sex marriage found in both the Old and New Testaments of the Bible, supporting a 
conclusion that homosexuality is considered to be a sin and same-sex marriage to be an 
extension of that sin).   
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Iowa and around the nation have strong religious views that yield the 
opposite conclusion.31   
This contrast of opinions in our society largely explains the absence of 
any religion-based rationale to test the constitutionality of Iowa’s same-sex 
marriage ban.  Our constitution does not permit any branch of government 
to resolve these types of religious debates and entrusts to courts the task of 
ensuring government avoids them.  See Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 (“The general 
assembly shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).  
The statute at issue in this case does not prescribe a definition of marriage 
for religious institutions.  Instead, the statute declares, “Marriage is a civil 
contract” and then regulates that civil contract.  Iowa Code § 595A.1.  Thus, 
in pursuing our task in this case, we proceed as civil judges, far removed 
from the theological debate of religious clerics, and focus only on the concept 
of civil marriage and the state licensing system that identifies a limited class 
of persons entitled to secular rights and benefits associated with civil 
marriage.   
 We, of course, have a constitutional mandate to protect the free 
exercise of religion in Iowa, which includes the freedom of a religious 
organization to define marriages it solemnizes as unions between a man and 
a woman.  See Iowa Const. art. I, § 3 (“The general assembly shall make no 
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . .”).  This mission to 
protect religious freedom is consistent with our task to prevent government 
                                       
31Many religions recognize same-sex marriage, such as Buddhists, Quakers, 
Unitarians, and Reform and Reconstructionist Jews.  Schuman, 96 Geo. L.J. at 2108.  
Amicus curiae Iowa and National Faith Leaders, Communities, and Scholars point out the 
United Church of Christ encourages, but does not require, its local congregations to adopt 
wedding policies that do not discriminate between heterosexual, gay, and lesbian couples, 
while the Episcopal Church permits priests to perform liturgies and blessings at same-sex 
weddings as a matter of pastoral care.  Additionally, many groups and clergy within various 
religions are working to achieve inclusion of same-sex marriage.  Id. at 2108–09. 
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from endorsing any religious view.  State government can have no religious 
views, either directly or indirectly, expressed through its legislation.  
Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 710, 166 N.W. 202, 208 (1918).  This 
proposition is the essence of the separation of church and state. 
 As a result, civil marriage must be judged under our constitutional 
standards of equal protection and not under religious doctrines or the 
religious views of individuals.  This approach does not disrespect or 
denigrate the religious views of many Iowans who may strongly believe in 
marriage as a dual-gender union, but considers, as we must, only the 
constitutional rights of all people, as expressed by the promise of equal 
protection for all.  We are not permitted to do less and would damage our 
constitution immeasurably by trying to do more.   
The only legitimate inquiry we can make is whether [the statute] 
is constitutional.  If it is not, its virtues . . . cannot save it; if it 
is, its faults cannot be invoked to accomplish its destruction.  If 
the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they 
pinch as well as when they comfort, they may as well be 
abandoned.  
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483, 54 S. Ct. 231, 256, 
78 L. Ed. 413, 452 (1934) (Sutherland, J. dissenting). 
In the final analysis, we give respect to the views of all Iowans on the 
issue of same-sex marriage—religious or otherwise—by giving respect to our 
constitutional principles.  These principles require that the state recognize 
both opposite-sex and same-sex civil marriage.  Religious doctrine and views 
contrary to this principle of law are unaffected, and people can continue to 
associate with the religion that best reflects their views.  A religious 
denomination can still define marriage as a union between a man and a 
woman, and a marriage ceremony performed by a minister, priest, rabbi, or 
other person ordained or designated as a leader of the person’s religious 
67 
 
faith does not lose its meaning as a sacrament or other religious institution.  
The sanctity of all religious marriages celebrated in the future will have the 
same meaning as those celebrated in the past.  The only difference is civil 
marriage will now take on a new meaning that reflects a more complete 
understanding of equal protection of the law.  This result is what our 
constitution requires. 
J.  Constitutional Infirmity.  We are firmly convinced the exclusion 
of gay and lesbian people from the institution of civil marriage does not 
substantially further any important governmental objective.  The legislature 
has excluded a historically disfavored class of persons from a supremely 
important civil institution without a constitutionally sufficient justification.  
There is no material fact, genuinely in dispute, that can affect this 
determination.   
We have a constitutional duty to ensure equal protection of the law.  
Faithfulness to that duty requires us to hold Iowa’s marriage statute, Iowa 
Code section 595.2, violates the Iowa Constitution.  To decide otherwise 
would be an abdication of our constitutional duty.  If gay and lesbian people 
must submit to different treatment without an exceedingly persuasive 
justification, they are deprived of the benefits of the principle of equal 
protection upon which the rule of law is founded.  Iowa Code section 595.2 
denies gay and lesbian people the equal protection of the law promised by 
the Iowa Constitution.32 
V.  Remedy.   
Because our civil marriage statute fails to provide equal protection of 
the law under the Iowa Constitution, we must decide how to best remedy the 
                                       
32Our decision that the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Iowa 
Constitution makes it unnecessary to address the other bases for plaintiffs’ challenge to 
Iowa’s marriage statute. 
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constitutional violation.  The sole remedy requested by plaintiffs is admission 
into the institution of civil marriage.  The County does not suggest an 
alternative remedy.  The high courts of other jurisdictions have remedied 
constitutionally invalid bans on same-sex marriage in two ways.  Some 
courts have ordered gay and lesbian people to be allowed to access the 
institution of civil marriage.  See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453; 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 480 (“definition of marriage necessarily must be 
expanded” to include same-sex couples); Opinions of the Justices to the 
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571 (Mass. 2004).  Other courts have allowed their 
state legislatures to create parallel civil institutions for same-sex couples.  
See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 
864, 887 (Vt. 1999). 
 Iowa Code section 595.2 is unconstitutional because the County has 
been unable to identify a constitutionally adequate justification for excluding 
plaintiffs from the institution of civil marriage.  A new distinction based on 
sexual orientation would be equally suspect and difficult to square with the 
fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in our constitution.  
This record, our independent research, and the appropriate equal protection 
analysis do not suggest the existence of a justification for such a legislative 
classification that substantially furthers any governmental objective.  
Consequently, the language in Iowa Code section 595.2 limiting civil 
marriage to a man and a woman must be stricken from the statute, and the 
remaining statutory language must be interpreted and applied in a manner 
allowing gay and lesbian people full access to the institution of civil 
marriage.   
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 VI.  Conclusion. 
 The district court properly granted summary judgment to plaintiffs.  
Iowa Code section 595.2 violates the equal protection provision of the Iowa 
Constitution.  Our decision becomes effective upon issuance of 
procedendo.33 
 AFFIRMED. 
 All justices concur. 
                                       
33See Iowa R. App. P. 6.1208 (stating procedendo shall issue twenty-one days after 
the opinion is filed unless a petition for rehearing is filed). 
